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Almost five million children of deceased, disabled and retired
workers received more than eight billion dollars in Social Security
dependent child benefits in 1979.' Because they had dependent
children in their care, more than one million mothers (and some
fathers) received about two billion additional dollars in benefits
from Social Security.2 Social Security benefits for children cost
roughly the same as Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC), our best-known welfare program for poor children and
their parentsA Children's Social Security benefits also cost more
than the food stamp program.
4
Although AFDC and the food stamp program have under-
gone intense scrutiny, criticism and increasing pressures for re-
form,5 the child benefits portion of Social Security has gone
largely unattended.' Since each of these three programs was de-
t Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley. B.S. 1964, J.D. 1967, North-
western University.
I In December, 1978, 4,938,441 children received Social Security Benefits of more
than $700 million. In 1979, payments surely exceeded $8 billion. See Quarterly Statistics,
Soc. SEC. BULL., June, 1979, at 72, 80 (table Q-9).
2 In December 1978, about 1,189,000 parents received Social Security benefits total-
ling $160 million because they had children in their care. Id. at 78 (table Q-7), 79 (table
Q-8), 80 (table Q-10). These recipients include widows'under age 60 with children, wives of
retirees with children, and wives of disabled workers with children. Some men in similar
situations also now draw Social Security benefits.
' In December, 1978, AFDC provided $891,399,000 of federal, state, and local funds
to 7,211,000 children and 3,481,000 families. See Current Operating Statistics, Soc. SEC.
BULL., June 1979, at 27, 55 (table M-32), 56 (table M-33).
4 See Donnelly, Food Stamp Costs Head for $10 Billion Mark, 38 CONG. Q. 191 (1980).
One commentator projects, however, that the food stamp program will cost $8.7 billion in
1980 and perhaps $10 billion in 1981. Id.
' For example, the Food Stamp Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-113, tit. XIII, § 1301, 91
Stat. 958 (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2017 (Supp. III 1979)) significantly modified the
food stamp program. Moreover, in 1977 President Carter proposed replacing food stamps
with cash grants as part of a comprehensive welfare reform and job guarantee program
titled the Program for Better Jobs and Income. See B. FRIEDMAN & L. HAUSMAN, WORK,
WELFARE AND THE PROGRAM FOR BETTER JOBS AND INCOME, A STUDY PREPARED FOR THE
USE OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977).
6 In recent years, several books about Social Security have received widespread atten-
tion. See R. CAMPBELL, SOCIAL SECURITY: PROMISE AND REALITY (1977); INSTITUTE FOR
CONTEMPORARY STUDIES, THE CRISIS IN SOCIAL SECURITY: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS (1977);
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signed to aid households with needy dependent children, in-
creased attention to the Social Security plan seems especially
appropriate. This Article examines the history and rationale for
Social Security dependents' benefits, criticizes a number of the pro-
gram's internal features, and compares the favorable treatment of
children who receive Social Security benefits with that of other
needy children. The Article concentrates on Title II of the Social
Security Act of 1935, 7 which provides for dependent children's
benefits, and concludes with an analysis of four reform options.
I
THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT OF 1935
The Social Security Act of 1935 contained four major cash
benefit programs. 8  Title II established the Old Age Insurance
Plan (OAI), which was designed to provide "earned" pensions to
retired workers. Congress has frequently modified this title, which
is now termed Old Age Survivors and Disability Insurance
(OASDI)." Benefits provided under Title II are typically called
Social Security. Title I created Old Age Assistance (OAA), a sys-
tem of federal grants to the states for need-based pensions for the
elderly who lacked adequate income from other sources. OAA
was replaced in 1972 by Title XVI, which established a federal pro-
gram of assistance to the needy aged, blind, and disabled, called
Supplemental Security Income (SSI).1o Titles III and IX set
up a cooperative federal-state unemployment compensation
scheme."1 Title IV established a system of federal grants to states
for Aid to Dependent Children (ADC). Since its enactment, Con-
A. MUNNELL, THE FUTURE OF SOCIAL SECURITY (1977); J. PECHMAN, H. AARON & M. TAUS-
SIG, SOCIAL SECURITY: PERSPECTIVES FOR REFORM (1968). None, however, adequately dis-
cussed children's benefits. Nor did the 1979 Advisory Council on Social Security consider
children's benefits in its final report. See 1979 ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY,
96TH CONG., IST SESS., REPORT (Comm. Print 1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 ADVISORY
COUNCIL REPORT].
7 Ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397f (1976)). Because
Social Security dependent children's benefits are provided by Title II of the Social Security
Act of 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 622 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-432 (1976)), this
Article will be concerned primarily with Title II. Dependents' benefits were not included in
the original 1935 Act; they were added by the 1939 Amendments (Social Security Act of
1939, ch. 666, 53 Stat. 1362).
8 See E. WITTE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 109-71 (1962).
9 Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Amendment of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, tit. III,
§ 300, 79 Stat. 361, 42 U.S.C. § 401 (1976).
10 Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329, 42 U.S.C.
§ 401 (1976).
"1 See 42 U.S.C. § 501-504, 1101-1108 (1976).
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gress modified this title in a variety of ways, and it is now desig-
nated Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).12  Ben-
efits under this provision are commonly referred to as "welfare."
A. The Justification for Old Age Insurance in 1935
When enacted in 1935, Congress intended Title II's Old Age
Insurance scheme to provide lifetime pensions to elderly retired
workers. These pensions were to be payable to retirees as a matter
of right, regardless of individual need. Yet Congress obviously
adopted the program to remedy widespread need. In 1935, the
country found itself with an enormous number of needy and un-
employed elderly people who had not saved enough for retire-
ment and were out of work. These people depended on their
families, private charity, or increasingly, the public dole for sup-
port.1 3  Congress took remedial action by enacting Old Age In-
surance to function as a forced savings plan. The government
would collect money during a worker's productive years so that
after his retirement he would receive an adequate pension. He
would avoid the stigma of a means tested program, and his fellow
citizens would avoid the burden of supporting him with their tax
dollars. In short, Congress envisioned that Title II benefits would
eventually eliminate most of the need for Title I Old Age Assist-
ance.14
12 See id. at § 601.
13 Private pensions established by industry were, in 1935, inadequate to the task. Fewer
than 15% of industrial workers were covered, and prospects for expansion seemed slim.
Moreover, long-term continuous service requirements greatly reduced the number of
employees who actually collected. See COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC SECURITY, SOCIAL SECURITY
IN AMERICA, THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT AS SUMMARIZED
FROM STAFF REPORTS TO THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC SECURITY 167-78 (1937). The
Committee on Economic Security was established by the Roosevelt Administration to de-
velop the Act. See notes 46-48 and accompanying text infra. Today, private pensions may
be replacing the need for Social Security. See P. DRUCKER, THE UNSEEN REvOLUTION: How
PENSION FUND SOCIALISM CAME TO AMERICA (1976).
14 See generally Martin, Public Assurance of an Adequate Minimum Income in Old Age: The
Erratic Partnership between Social Insurance and Public Assistance, 64 CORNELL L. REv. 437
(1979). Title I was a grant-in-aid plan that subsidized state programs for aid to the aged.
At the time, state old age assistance was itself a new approach. Before 1923, there was very
little cash relief available to the elderly poor, and none through permanent state programs.
Often only institutions such as the poorhouse and county farm provided assistance. Most
dependent aged persons were supported by their families, primarily their adult children.
Between 1923 and the end of 1934, however, 28 states adopted old age assistance plans.
Yet until 1928, almost all the old age assistance recipients lived in Montana, the first state
to adopt a plan, with only 884 recipients in 1928. Moreover, because of the depression,
only 16 state plans were actually operating in 1933 and many had long waiting lists. At the
end of 1934, there were 236,000 old age assistance recipients nationally, who received a
total of $32 million or an average of $14.68 per month. Two-thirids resided in California,
Massachusetts and New York. COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC SECURITY, supra note 13, at 156-65.
838 [Vol. 65:836
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Title II was designed to provide retired workers benefits that
would reflect their earnings when employed. The drafters aimed
for a forty- to fifty-percent wage replacement rate. 15  Making
benefits wage related was justified on the ground that higher
wage earners would be paying greater Social Security taxes. The
shared employer-employee payroll taxes that Title VIII levied
were viewed as "contributions" or "premiums" that funded the
Title II retirement benefit program. Thus, the tax and benefit
provisions combined to create a kind of personal annuity contract
which would maintain "individual equity."
Congress never explained why it required higher earners to
save more or "buy a larger annuity.' 6 Its purpose may have
been to protect retired workers against a dramatic decline in their
standard of living. Perhaps a better justification is that the pur-
chase of larger annuities by higher wage earners would comport
with the expected behavior of fully-informed "rational" workers
contracting with private insurance companies. Tradition also fa-
vored wage-related benefits because many industrial pension plans
then in effect followed this pattern.1 7
Finally, Congress probably had a pragmatic concern: requir-
ing all workers to defer the same amount of current income to
earn the same pension might have produced either an excessive
drain on the income of low earners or such a modest level of
"savings" that retirement benefits for most workers would be in-
sufficient to meet Title II's goals. Although the 1935 Act might
not appear to require higher income workers to "save" much
more than lower wage earners because the calculations for tax
payments (and benefits) were based on only the first $3,000 of
wages each year, most workers in the 1930's earned less than that.
In 1936, for example, wages averaged about $25 per week, 8 or
about $1,300 annually. In any case, whatever the appropriateness
of wage-related (and, in turn, contribution-related) pensions for
In short, Title I was designed to revive, expand, and improve the floundering state old-age
assistance plans. Many Congressmen considered it the most important part of the 1935
Social Security Act. See E. Witte, supra note 8, at 143.
, See, e.g., COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC SECURITY, supra note 13, at 202, 211.
16 See, e.g., id. at 202.
1 See id. at 173. Further, wage-related benefits were provided by both the 1934 Rail-
road Retirement Act, ch. 868, 48 Stat. 1283, which was declared unconstitutional, and the
1935 Railroad Retirement Act, ch. 812, 49 Stat. 967. See CoMITTEE ON ECONOMIC SE-
CURITY, supra note 13, at 173, 178. But see text accompanying note 24 infra. Of course, in
the private sector, the plan might not be "contributory" and such benefits might be seen as
a reward for past contribution to the enterprise.
,8 L. KAMISAR, DOWN AND OUT IN THE U.S.A. 63 (1973).
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workers, the principle is firmly.embedded in the American theory
of Social Security."
From the start, however, Congress contemplated two impor-
tant deviations from pure individual equity. In the name of "social
adequacy,"2"' the annuity benefits some workers were to receive
exceeded what they could have purchased from private insurers
had they used an amount equal to their Social Security taxes as
premiums. The first deviation favored workers who would retire
in the early years of the plan. They would be entitled to benefits
far greater than those justified by their own plus their employer's
actual "contributions." This bias was clearly necessary, however, if
the plan was to have any immediate impact on the problems of
the elderly poor. Without it, at least a gerieration would have
passed before retirees had "saved" enough through Social Security
to collect adequate pensions.2" In addition, this deviation from
individual equity was common among newly-adopted pension
plans in private industry. Even today, older workers are often
given, in effect, retroactive contribution accounts.2
For the Social Security fund to become ultimately self-
sufficient, however, later retirees had to pay the price of favoring
early retirees. Workers entering the labor force after 1949 were
scheduled to receive less in Social Security benefits than they
might have obtained by investing privately an amount equal to the
combined employee and employer taxes. 23 Even for these work-
ers, however, the projected Title II pensions exceeded what their
own employee tax "contributions" could generate in the private
annuity market. In short, although Social Security planners were
committed to preserving individual equity with respect to the
employee's tax payments, they felt that taxes paid by employers
could be used for social adequacy purposes. This commitment set
an important precedent, even though Social Security to date has
turned out to be a better "deal" for all retirees than Congress
originally anticipated.
19 This is not to say that the wage-related concept of Social Security has not been
criticized. Indeed, some economists think Social Security should be entirely abolished. See
M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962); W. SHORE, SOCIAL SECURITY: THE FRAUD
IN YOUR FUTURE (1975).
20 For a discussion of adequacy and -equity in social insurance, see W. HABER & W.
COHEN, SOCIAL SECURITY: PROGRAMS, PROBLEMS AND POLICIES 14-16 (1960).
21 See R. MYERS, SOCIAL SECURITY 9 (1975).
22 See E. WITTE, supra note 8, at 148-49, 152.
23 See E. Witte, Old-Age Security in the Social Security Act, in SOCIAL SECURITY PERSPEC-
TIVES 131-32 (Lampman ed. 1962).
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Congress adopted a second deviation from the principle of
individual equity. Although tax rates corresponded to wage levels
up to the $3,000 annual ceiling, benefits replaced a greater pro-
portion of the income of lower wage earners than of higher wage
earners. The purpose of this feature was, quite plainly, to keep
retirees who had been low earners from having to supplement
Social Security with the dole. It also reflected the terms of a
number of private pension plans. Indeed, even today in some pri-
vate plans, pension annuities are completely unrelated to wages
and are based solely on length of employment.2 4 The commit-
ment to social adequacy reflected in a higher wage replacement
rate for low earners has remained a central feature of OASDI.
Congress implemented its decision to favor both early re-
tirees and low earners in the 1935 Act with a single benefit for-
mfila. The lifetime pension of a worker retiring at age sixty-five
was determined by first calculating his total accumulated wages
since 1937, taking into account only the first $3,000 for any one
year. Monthly benefits were 1/2% of the first $3,000 of accumu-
lated wages, plus 1/12% of the next $42,000, plus 1/24% of all
accumulated wages in excess of $45,000.25 Thus, for example,
the first $3,000 in wages produced a pension of $15 a month,
while the next $3,000 added only $2.50 more. The formula fa-
vored low earners and workers with few years of work prior to
retirement, because both would have relatively less accumulated
wages. The Act also imposed an $85 per month benefit
maximum, which was reached with $129,000 in accumulated
wages. 6 But it meant little. Even if a worker earned $3,000 per
year, he would only reach the maximum after 43 years of
employment. Even if some individuals would eventually have
more years of covered work, that could not begin to occur until
about 1980 under the original scheme. Because retirement be-
nefits were not payable until a worker accumulated $2,000 in co-
vered wages, the Act also effectively created a $10 per month
minimum pension.27
24 See generally BANKERS TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YORK, 1975 STUDY OF CORPORATE
PENSION PLANS (1975); Skolnik, Private Pension Plans, 1950-74, Soc. SEC. BULL., June,
1976, at 11-14.
25 Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, § 202(a), 49 Stat. 623 (current version at 42
U.S.C. § 402 (1976)).
16 Id. § 202(b). See COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC SECURITY, supra note 13, at 224.
27 Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, § 210(c)(2), 49 Stat. 623 (current version at 42
U.S.C. § 402 (1976)).
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Title II's benefit package lacked options that typically would
be available in private pension plans. For example, -workers could
not divert funds from their lifetime annuities to acquire life in-
surance; nor could they elect a reduced pension in return for a
continued payment of the annuity to their spouses after death.28
The drafters of Title II were comrhitted to a single benefit struc-
ture and thus had to design a uniform pension package. The Act
provided that if a worker died (either before or after age sixty-
five) before receiving retirement benefits equal to 3 1/2% of his
covered wages accumulated since 1937, his estate would receive a
lump sum equal to the difference. Although those who lived un-
usually long would benefit from the lifetime annuity arrangement,
those who died unusually young were provided with the equiva-
lent of a "life insurance" policy in an amount approximating the
combined employer and employee "premiums.' 29 This feature,
which would yield increasing amounts of "life insurance" as a
worker approached age sixty-five, is better understood as a politi-
cal response to the argument that the Social Security program
would forcibly take money from some who would never benefit
than as a well-conceived plan for protecting the worker's sur-
vivors. At most, the lump sum payment would equal a few years'
pension and it would usually be less.3 0
Title II of the 1935 Act is also significant because of what it
omitted. The drafters gave no serious public consideration to pro-
viding additional "social adequacy" benefits directly to needy de-
pendents. 3 1 In 1935, however, Congress still regarded social
adequacy in individual terms. Thus, even though the Act pro-
vided the retired low wage earner with a pension that represented
a relatively higher proportion of his past wages than his more
affluent counterpart's, the worker's benefits did not take into ac-
28 By contrast, under the 1935 Railroad Retirement Act, ch. 812, § 5, 49 Stat. 967
(current version at 45 U.S.C. § 231 (1976)) a worker could elect a reduced pension in
order to have his annuity paid to his spouse when he died. COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC
SECoRITY, supra note 13, at 179.
29 See COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC SECURITY, supra note 13, at 212. The Title VIII tax
rate was initially to be one percent of the first $3,000 of the employer's wages. The rate
was to be in effect until 1939, when it was to increase to 1 1/2%. In 1943, it was to increase
to 2%, then to 2 1/2% in 1946 and 3% in 1948. Id. at 213.
30 For example, if a worker had $50,000 in total accumulated wages when he died, his
death benefit would be $1,750. If the same worker retired with $50,000 in accumulated
wages, he would receive benefits of $625 per year. Thus, the death benefit was equivalent
to less than three years of retirement benefits. See id. at 224.
31 I have two main classes of presumptively needy dependents in mind: (a) surviving
children and widows of deceased workers or deceased retirees and (b) housewives and
young children of retired workers.
842 [Vol. 65:836
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count" the number of his dependents. Moreover, apart from the
lump sum payment to his estate, once the worker died, all benefits
to his household ended. 2
There are a number of possible justifications for Congress'
omission of dependents' benefits from the benefit structure of
Title II. First, the omission greatly simplified the Act's administra-
tion. Second, the concepts of "earned" pension and individual
equity were central to the plan's political sales effort; and the de-
viations adopted were more likely to appear work-based.
Moreover, if two workers earn identical wages, the one with more
dependents probably has a lower standard of living, and giving
the two workers identical benefits leaves them in the same relative
economic position.
Third, many viewed family size and the extra need associated
with greater dependents as purely a matter of personal choice. 3
This attitude reflected the long-standing American practice of
paying workers without adjustment for family size. This attitude
was also reflected in the Workmen's Compensation Acts, enacted
32 See generally id. at 181-88, 459-67. By contrast, most old age insurance systems in
other countries explicitly provided survivors' benefits. A report based on Social Security
Act background papers suggests that Congress ducked this issue: "While a supplementary
system of survivors' insurance paying regular monthly benefits to qualified dependents is
socially far more desirable than [the death benefit that was included] it was not deemed
advisable to recommend such a system until further investigation was possible." Id. at 204.
Professor J. Douglas Brown, who was involved in the process, blames fear of Congressional
opposition and Supreme Court hostility (as well as concerns about higher costs) for the
failure of the original act to include dependents' benefits. See J. BROWN, AN AMERICAN
PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SECURITY 132 (1972).
a3 The belief that family size is a private matter and not an appropriate reason for
extra transfer payments may have been partially rooted in prejudice.
European laws generally provide dependents' allowances [in unemployment
compensation]. Such provision is open to the objection that it introduces the
element of need with all its implications of investigation and administrative de-
tail; it prevents relating benefits closely to contributions and favors racial or other
groups with high birth rates.
Id. at 119. The anti-black, anti-Catholic overtones of this quote should not be overem-
phasized, however. For example, on the Advisory Council on Economic Security, which
expressed its views on the proposed economic security package to the Committee on
Economic Security, there were no Catholics among the 20 original members. Professor
Witte believes this was simply a gaffe. When it appeared that there were no Catholics on
the Committee, the Administration quickly added two. E. WIT-rE, supra note 8, at 52-53.
The Social Security Act developers seemed naive about racial issues. When Congress de-
bated the OAA proposal, Southern political leaders successfully fought to reduce federal
supervisory powers over state programs to be sure that the government would not "deny
aid to any state because it discriminated against Negroes in the administration of old age
assistance." Id. at 144. Professor Witte states that "it had never occurred to any person
connected with the Committee on Economic Security that the Negro question would come
up in this connection." Id.
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in the early 1900's, which typically did not provide extra sums for
dependents of injured workers. 4 The state unemployment com-
pensation acts, adopted in response to Titles III and IX of the
1935 Act, also generally paid wage-related benefits that were un-
related to family size.
35
Fourth, Congress surely realized that workers with families
could voluntarily buy adequate life insurance to protect their sur-
vivors. Otherwise, given the "no option" benefit structure of Title
II, providing adequate survivor benefits would probably compel
single persons-and perhaps those with working spouses-to buy
something they did not want.
Finally, Congress did not completely ignore a worker's sur-
vivors. Elderly widows could claim old age grants under Title 1.
36
Moreover, although not considered as an alternative to the expan-
sion of Title II, Congress intended Title IV's Aid to Dependent
Children plan to benefit young "orphans" and their mothers.
B. Children's Benefits
Long before 1935, it was widely agreed that children were
entitled to the basic necessities of life-food, shelter, and educa-
tion. Apart from education, the primary obligation to provide and
pay for these necessities traditionally rested with the family. In-
deed, until very recently, the legal obligation lay squarely on the
father 3 7 and the traditional assumption has been that if the man
of the house is working, the basic needs of his children will be
met. Thus, in the 1930's, the plight of impoverished children was
thought to be due mainly to their father's unemployment. The
Roosevelt Administration attacked that problem in a variety of
ways: through action designed to revive the economy generally,
with public employment programs, and by adopting an un-
employment compensation scheme that would replace a portion
of a worker's wages during periods of temporary involuntary un-
See generally 2 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 62 (1976).
In 1936, for example, only the unemployment compensation law of the District of
Columbia provided dependents' allowances. States typically replaced 50% of an un-
employed worker's wages but the District provided 40% of wages to a single worker, 50%
of wages for a worker with a dependent spouse, and an additional 5% of wages for each
child, up to a maximum of 65% of wages. COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC SECURITY, supra note
13, at 440, app. V.
36 Widows under age sixty-five and, in some states, under age seventy were ineligible
unless they had a minor child in their care. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(e) (1976); Committee on
Economic Security, supra note 13, at 161, table 36.
1, H. CLARK, LAw OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 6.2, at 187-89 (1968).
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employment. In 1938, the administration sponsored minimum
wage laws to attack the problem posed by those who were
employed but inadequately paid .38
Although the needs of most children could apparently be
met by providing work or unemployment benefits for their
fathers, not all children had fathers to whom they could turn. In
the early history of our nation, society employed a variety of
methods to deal with such children. Many were placed in institu-
tions. Others were identured to work at very early ages, placed in
foster homes, or supported by private charity.3 9 Many such
"poor relief" mechanisms are still with us. After the first White
House Conference on Children- in 1909, however, a distinctive
strategy known as Mothers' Pensions emerged.4" It evolved into
the current AFDC Program.
The Mothers' Pension movement sought to relieve poor
mothers with dependent children and no husbands to support
them from primitive "poor relief" schemes. Mothers received cash
that enabled them to raise their children at home. This was
known as "outdoor" relief, in contrast to "indoor" (or institutional)
relief. But not all husbandless mothers were to be eligible for
Mothers' Pensions. The guiding theme of the movement was that
outdoor relief was appropriate only if the mothers met certain
standards of parenting. Social workers and other child welfare
professionals felt that this new type of aid should be made availa-
ble only to women who were professionally certified. Because its
recipients were the "deserving" poor, Mothers' Pensions were
supposed to be received with pride.
Illinois enacted the first program in 1911. By 1934, forty-five
states had followed suit.41  Yet i'n the early 1930's, many plans
were in desperate financial straits and unable to fulfill the needs
of long waiting lists of qualified applicants. Moreover, in most
states the Mothers' Pension plans did not compel the cooperation
of local authorities; more than half the states made no financial
contribution.42
38 See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 672, § 6, 52 Stat. 1062 (current version at
29 U.S.C. § 206 (1976)).
See generally J. BROWN, PUBLIC RELIEF 1929-1939, 1-38 (1940).
4 See generally W. BELL, AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN 3-19 (1965); COMMITTEE ON
ECONOMIC SECURITY, supra note 13, at 233-50; J. HANDLER, REFORMING THE POOR 11-16
(1972); R. LUBOVE, THE STRUGGLE FOR SOCIAL SECURITY 1900-1935, 92-112 (1968). See also
Leff, Consensus for Reform: The Mothers'-Pension Movement in the Progressive Era, 47 Soc. SERV-
ICE REV. 397 (1973).
41 COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC SECURITY, supra note 13, at 233-37.
42 J. BROWN, supra note 39, at 27-28.
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The promoters of Mothers' Pensions designed the program
primarily to benefit widows. In many states, to the extent that a
Mothers' Pension program operated at all, it was almost exclu-
sively limited to them. Mothers who did not receive benefits from
Mothers' Pensions continued to rely on whatever general relief
plan was available in their localities. 43  Many women whose hus-
bands had deserted them, who were divorced, or who had il-
legitimate children-as well as "uncertified" widows-found
themselves relegated to a less deserving category of the poor.
44
Congress intended Title IV of the 1935 Act, Aid to Depen-
dent Children (ADC), to serve the Mothers' Pensions population.
A grant-in-aid plan with few federal requirements, 4 ADC began
as a federal bailout of the state Mothers' Pensions programs. Con-
gress did not view Title IV as a high priority item, and did not
coordinate it with Title II.
The development of the Social Security Act of 1935 formally
began on June 29, 1934, when President Roosevelt appointed a
Committee on Economic Security. 46  Because responsibility for
the problems of old age security and the security of children was
divided among the Committee's staff, the proposals for Old Age
Insurance and Old Age Assistance arose out of work separate
from that which led to Title IV. 47  Attention was divided still
See generally W. BELL, supra note 40, at 9-13.
" See J. HANDLER, supra note 40, at 12.
4' See Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, §§ 401-06, 49 Stat. 627 (current version at
42 U.S.C. §§ 601-610 (1976)).
" Frances Perkins, Secretary of Labor, chaired the Committee. See generally G. MARTIN,
MADAM SECRETARY, FRANCES PERKINS (1976). Other members included the Secretary of the
Treasury, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Agriculture, and the Federal Emergency
Relief (FERA) Administrator, Harry Hopkins. Perkins, Hopkins and Dr. Arthur Altmeyer,
Second Assistant Secretary of Labor, were the Committee's most active members. E. WITTE,
supra note 8, at 7-9. Hopkins had headed President Roosevelt's temporary emergency ad-
ministration when Roosevelt was governor of New York. Altmeyer later became the long-
time chairman of the Social Security Board, which ran the Social Security program.
FERA, Roosevelt's first stop-gap federal welfare plan, was adopted by Congress in
early 1933. Hopkins designed and ran FERA, which from the start emphasized public
employment as well as cash grants. See A. SCHLESINGER, THE COMING OF THE NEw DEAL
263-81 (1959). Although the Administration had always intended to phase out FERA, the
Social Security Act was meant to be permanent and to take over part of FERA's functions.
FERA was dissolved at the end of 1935. For Hopkins' version of federal relief efforts, see
H. HOPKINS, SPENDING TO SAVE (1936). Perkins, the first woman cabinet member, also
came to Washington from New York, where she had been Roosevelt's Industrial Commis-
sioner. See A. SCHLESINGER, supra, at 299. See generally, G. MARTIN, supra, at 341-56. Profes-
sor Edwin E. Witte served as the Committee's director and supervised its staff studies.
Various advisory bodies provided ideas, reactions, and audiences for the Committee. See
generally, E. WI-TrE, supra note 8, at 22-63.
" The proposals were also developed separately from Title V programs-child welfare
services, maternal and child health services, and crippled children's services. University of
California law professor Barbara Armstrong headed up the studies for the old age pro-
846
CHILDREN'S BENEFITS
further because the different titles had their own natural con-
stituents. Indeed, for a time it looked as if Congress would enact
only Title I, and perhaps the unemployment compensation pro-
gram. Professor Witte argues that had the President not insisted
that Congress act on the entire package, it probably would have
provided no federal support of Mothers' Pensions at all.48  As it
was, the federal support recommended by the Committee for
ADC-one-third of state costs-was less than the support pro-
posed for OAA-one-half. Congress not only adopted this lesser
amount, but further limited federal aid to a maximum of $6 per
month (1/3 of $18) for the first child and $4 per month (1/3 of
$12) for additional children. 49 By contrast, Congress provided
up to $15 per month (1/2 of $30) to support OAA grants to el-
derly persons.50
Nevertheless, ADC did provide benefits for the dependents
of some workers, and Title II did not. Title IV's first appropria-
tion was more than $24 million,51 and in 1936, ADC paid recip-
ients a total of about $50 million in benefits from federal, state
and local sources. 2 Meanwhile, the Social Security Board was
still collecting taxes and paying virtually nothing. No retirement
payments were scheduled under Title II until January 1, 1942.
II
SOCIAL SECURITY DEPENDENTS' BENEFITS:
THE 1939 AMENDMENTS
The most far-reaching of Congress' 1939 amendments to the
major Social Security Act programs were those to Title II.13  A
basic change was the creation in Title II of benefits for depen-
grams; Katherine Lenrost and Dr. Martha Eliott of the Children's Bureau (until then largely
a children's research and advocacy group in the Department of Labor) headed the staff
work that led to the recommendations for grants-in-aid to states for aid to dependent
children. See COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC SECUIUTY, supra note 13, at 135, 227; E. WITTE,
supra note 8, at 30.
4' See id. at 164.
4' Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, § 403(n), 49 Stat. 628 (current version at 42
U.S.C. § 603 (1976)). Witte provides a fascinating account of how the ADC amounts were
determined. See E. WITTE, supra note 8, at 163.
50 Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, § 3(a), 49 Stat. 621 (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§ 303 (1976)).
51 COMMITrEE ON ECONOMIC SECURITY, supra note 13, at 292.
52 SOC. SEC. BULL-ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT, 1974, Table 153, at 173.
53 For example, these amendments also increased the federal share of state ADC costs
from one-third to one-half. Social Security Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, tit. IV, § 402(a),
53 Stat. 1362 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 403(a) (1935)).
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dents and the virtual ending of the existing death benefits. 54
This change represented a theoretical shift from the individual
equity underpinnings of the 1935 Act towards a social adequacy
theory. 55  Part II of this Article examines (1) the problems de-
pendents' benefits were intended to remedy and (2) the legislative
history of the basic dependents' benefits provisions.
A. The Need for Dependents' Benefits
Proponents of Social Security realized that the 1935 Act
would provide lower retirement benefits to an individual retiree
and his wife than were being paid by many state OAA plans.56
The proponents of Social Security originally conceded that Title
II's modest benefit levels would have to be tolerated in the early
years of the program and that some families would have to claim
under both programs. Tolerance of widespread dependence on
OAA was, however, short-lived. To help overcome that depen-
dence, the 1939 Amendments provided Title II dependents' ben-
efits to both wives over age sixty-five and children under age
eighteen of insured retirees. Each dependent was to receive a
benefit iequal to 50% of the retiree's benefit, or the "primary in-
surance benefit."
Similarly, the lump sum death benefit payable to deceased
workers' estates was usually inadequate to support the worker's
surviving family. As a result, many children and their mothers
turned to ADC and many elderly widows resorted to OAA. Al-
though Mothers' Pensions were originally conceived as a program
for the "deserving" poor, the drafters of the 1939 Amendments
concluded that Title II survivor benefits were preferable. The
Amendments granted Title II survivor benefits to elderly widows
of workers, to minor children of deceased workers, and to their
mothers while the children were young. Widows' and mothers'
benefits constituted 75% of workers' primary insurance benefit,
-1 The amendments also changed the method of calculating a worker's individual
monthly retirement benefits by abandoning the accumulated wages concept in favor of an
average monthly wages formula. Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, tit. II,
§§ 202(a), 209(e), 53 Stat. 1362 (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 402, 409 (1935)). Yet the new
formula maintained the basic principles of the 1935 Act. Individual equity generally de-
termined an individual worker's benefits, with special consideration given to early retirees
and low wage earners. Indeed, Congress intended the shift to average monthly wages to
preserve the favored positions of long-time low earners and early retirees, while denying
such status to retirees with only a few high wage years of coverage. See Soc. SEC. BULL.,
Dec. 1939, at 6.
55 J. BROWN, supra note 32, at 135-36.
56 E. WIrrE, supra note 23, at 138.
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calculated by reference to wages earned until his death. Children's
benefits were 50% of the workers' primary insurance benefit.
57
Thus, the 1939 Amendments provided workers-at no extra
cost-with earnings-related life insurance policies and retirement
bonuses that increased with the number of their dependents.
Congress' solution to the alleged deficiencies of the 1935 Act
raises several important questions. First, why was it undesirable
for dependents to resort to ADC and OAA? If those programs
were flawed, why were they not amended? If their difficulties
were insoluble, why were not all their beneficiaries transferred
into Title II? For example, why were only some dependent chil-
dren entitled to Social Security? In addition, once Social Security
benefits were extended to certain dependents, what criteria
guided the choice of factors that determined who received ben-
efits? Most important, why were dependents' benefits calculated as
a percentage of worker primary insurance amounts instead of a flat
grant for dependents, or a Title II family minimum based on
family size? A careful look at the steps leading to the 1939
Amendments will help answer these questions.
B. The Administration's Initiative
1. The Advisory Council
In early 1937, the Senate Finance Committee and the Social
Security Board agreed to create an Advisory Council on Social
Security to study possible amendments to Title 11.58 The most
important questions to be considered were: (1) whether the system
should start paying out retirement benefits sooner than January 1,
1942; (2) whether the benefits to retirees in the earlier years should
be made even larger than contemplated; and (3) whether to alter
the policy of accumulating reserves for future Social Security
payments and holding them in government securities.59  Also in-
cluded among the subjects for study was the "advisability of ex-
5 If neither a widow nor minor children survived a deceased worker, his dependent
parents received benefits equal to 50% of his primary insurance benefits. Social Security
Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, tit. II, § 202(f)(1), 53 Stat. 1362 (amending 42 U.S.C.
§ 402 (1935)).
" This Advisory Council on Social Security was the first of many. 42 U.S.C. § 907(a)
(1976) requires the establishment of an advisory council every four years to consider major
policy changes in the Social Security program.
59 A. ALTMEYER, THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF SOCIAL SECURITY 88-89 (1966).
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tending the benefits ... to survivors of individuals entitled to such
benefits." 60
Appointed in May 1937, the Council did not meet until
November 61 because of hostilities expressed by Democrats on the
House Ways and Means Committee who felt that they-and not
the Council-should initiate proposals for Social Security re-
form."2 On September 11, 1937, Social Security Board Chairman
Altmeyer sent a memorandum to President Roosevelt proposing
specific positions for the Administration to adopt on reform is-
sues. This memorandum became the focal point of the Advisory
Council's deliberations. 63  Altmeyer proposed that the reform
measures provide benefits for wives of retired Social Security ben-
eficiaries and for surviving widows and children of deceased
workers.6 4
On April 28, 1938, the President, at Altmeyer's urging, re-
quested the Social Security Board to consider "providing benefits
for aged wives and widows, and providing benefits for young
children of insured persons dying before reaching retirement
age." 65
On December 10, 1938, the Advisory council issued its re-
port, which clearly reflected the influence of Altmeyer and his
staff:
I. The average old-age benefits payable in the early years
under Title II should be increased.
III. The enhancement of the early old-age benefits under the
system should be partly attained by the method of paying in the
case of a married annuitant a supplementary allowance on be-
half of an aged wife equivalent to fifty per cent of the hus-
band's own benefit; provided, that should a wife after attaining
age 65 be otherwise eligible to a benefit in her own right which
is larger in amount than the wife's allowance payable to her
husband on her behalf, the benefit payable to her in her own
right will be substituted for the wife's allowance.
60 1938 ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY, 75TH CONG., 2ND SESS., REPORT 3
(Comm. Print 1938) [hereinafter cited as 1938 ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT].
61 Id. at 3, 6.
62 See A. ALTMEYER, supra note 59, at 90.
63 Id. at 91. In the memorandum, Altmeyer reveals conclusions about appropriate
changes that he had already made after discussions with Labor Secretary Perkins, and
Roosevelt advisor Hopkins, who continued to play key roles in the evolution of the Social
Security program.
64 Id. at 296-97.
" Id. at 91.
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V. The widow of an insured worker, following her attainment
of age 65, should receive an annuity bearing a reasonable rela-
tionship to the worker's annuity....
VI. A dependent child of a currently insured individual upon
the latter's death prior to age 65 should receive an orphan's
benefit, and a widow of a currently insured individual, pro-
vided she has in her care one or more dependent children of
the deceased husband, should receive a widow's benefit....
VIII. In order to compensate in part for the additional cost of
the additional benefits herein recommended, the benefits pay-
able to individuals as single annuitants after the plan has been
in operation a number of years should be reduced below those
now incorporated in Title II....
IX. The death benefit payable on account of coverage under
the system should be strictly limited in amount and payable on
the death of any eligible individual.
66
To fully understand children's benefits, the proposed treatment
of elderly wives requires attention first.
a. Wives' Benefits. The council reemphasized the theme of the
1935 Act: a preference for the elderly to retire with what was
perceived to be an earned Social Security pension rather than the
more "charitable" Old Age Assistance benefits. Old age income
protection as a matter of right should be based upon "past par-
ticipation in the productive processes of the country," the Council
argued, because this policy is more "in harmony with individual
incentive within a democratic society" than is dependency re-
lief.67  It was clear to the Council that when Social Security ben-
efits started flowing, many retirees would find them wholly in-
adequate and would be forced to apply for public assistance as
well. 68  In short, even with the benefit bias in favor of early re-
tirees and low wage earners, Social Security benefits, under the
1935 benefit structure, could not satisfy the basic needs of many
recipients.6" The Council might have easily avoided this con-
6 1938 ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 60, at 9-10.
67 Id. at 17.
68 For example, it was estimated that by 1945, the average monthly Social Security
benefit would be $19.00. Id. at 13. The average individual Old Age Assistance grant in
1938 was already $19.21 per month, and substantially larger in the case of an aged couple.
Id. at 16. Average individual Old Age Assistance grants varied from $6.37 per month in
Mississippi to $32.39 per month in California. Half the grants ranged from $15 to $30. Id.
69 For a contemporaneous discussion of proposals to remedy this problem, see P.
Dou-LAs, SOCIAL SECURITY IN THE UNITED STATES 393-98 (2d ed. 1939).
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tinued dependency on "welfare" programs by simply increasing
early Social Security pensions. Social adequacy was already an ac-
cepted part of the Old Age Insurance scheme; why did the Coun-
cil not simply accord it increased weight?
70
The Advisory Council did not, however, propose simple ex-
tensions of existing "social adequacy" features, such as increasing
the monthly minimum pension from $10 to $25, or increasing the
benefit formula from 1/2% monthly of the first $3,000 in accumu-
lated wages to 1%. By 1938, the Council's appreciation of the
"need" for higher benefits was too sophisticated to permit such a
simple solution. Not all workers would need more. The Council
argued that the need for larger pensions depended upon a variety
of factors-for example, whether the worker was single or mar-
ried, and if married, whether the spouse also had an earned So-
cial Security pension.
This reasoning should have led the Council to advocate a
higher minimum Title II benefit for married pensioners or a uni-
form allowance for wives of retired workers. It did not. Rather,
the Council proposed that a wife's benefit amount to 50% of the
worker's benefit. This proposal is at odds with the Council's
rationale, because it would mean that funds would be paid to
couples for whom the primary insurance benefit was adequate.
Moreover, the proposal treated wives of higher.income workers
more favorably than wives of lower income workers.
The Council furnished scant justification for this anomalous
result. It might have argued that those with higher wages had
"earned" greater benefits for their wives by paying larger "con-
tributions". But the Council did not assert this. It viewed the ben-
efits justified by a worker's share of the Social Security taxes as
his only "entitlement." For example, the council argued that single
annuitants "should receive in all cases insurance protection at least
equal in value to their individual direct contributions invested at
interest" 71 -more than they could obtain from private insurance
schemes. Wives' benefits would come out of the employer's share,
which the Council thought could fairly be used for social ade-
quacy purposes. This view was necessary to support its recommen-
dations, which called for reducing the benefits that some single
retirees could have expected under the 1935 formula. 72 The pro-
70 Of course, the larger benefits would in fact be no more individually "earned" than
public assistance.
71 See 1938 ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 60, at 26.
72 Id. at 10.
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posals covering wives were supposed to meet social needs.7 3 Yet
the Council provided no satisfactory theoretical justification for
basing a wife's benefits on her husband's earnings. The Council
stated that it "believe[d] that an additional 50 per cent of the basic
annuity would constitute a reasonable provision for the support of
the annuitant's wife." 74  This is hardly a justification. Indeed, in
1971 Professor J. Douglas Brown, chairman of the 1937-38 Ad-
visory Council, observed:
The question might be asked: Why did the Advisory Council
hit upon 50 percent as the wife's allowance? In the recollection
of the chairman of the Council, no other percentage was dis-
cussed. It was a common-sense judgment and not the result of
elaborate studies. "Fifty percent" possessed a quality which
might be termed "aesthetic logic" in that it looked right. Any
other percentage would have seemed awkward and have en-
couraged debate. The fact that the 50 percent figure has never
been challenged and has remained unchanged for thirty years
appears to support the judgment of the Council in reflecting
the consensus of the American people.
75
The Council was apparently seeking a mechanism that for-
mally would be a permanent feature of the plan but in practice
would operate to increase benefits primarily in the program's
early years. The Council anticipated that its wives' benefit pro-
posal would achieve this objective since it would only be available
when the wife had an insufficient benefit account of her own, and
many women would soon be building up their own benefits.7 6
But this objective alone fails to justify the choice of an allowance
related to the husband's wage. The same assumption about
women in the work force would make a minimum family benefit
and a uniform pension for workers' wives self-liquidating.
The flavor of the Council's further explanations of its pro-
posal can be sensed from its statement: ".... the payment of higher
benefits to persons retiring in the earlier years of-the system ...
should not be at the expense of reasonable differentials in benefit
payments as related to taxable wages earned." 7  Thus, it appears
that the Advisory Council was eager to preserve the principle that
73 Cf. id. at 24 (allowances to annuitants with elderly wives designed to "meet the
greatest social need with the minimum increase in cost"); id. at 21 (purpose of Social Se-
curity to prevent dependency and to provide a minimum subsistence income).
74 Id. at 24-25.
75 J. BROWN, supra note 32, at 139.
76 In 1978, however, more than 2 million elderly wives were still receiving dependents'
benefits under OASDHI. See Soc. SEC. BULL., June 1979, at 78.
77 1938 ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 60, at 22.
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couples that had earned more should receive more benefits along
the entire length of the benefit schedule. Therefore, it would be
unwilling to adopt a solution that relied upon a socially adequate
family minimum if a substantial portion of the distribution
schedule would be flat-that is, if over a fairly large income
range, extra past wages would not result in a higher family pen-
sion. This would have been the likely result of a family minimum
provision, especially in the early years. Thus, to protect Social
Security from appearing to the public as purely a public relief
program, the Council, perhaps wisely, concluded that the plan's
relief aspects must not undermine its overall wage-related charac-
ter.78  Nevertheless, the wage related nature of total husband and
wife benefits might have been preserved by phasing out the wife's
allowance while increasing the husband's earned benefit at a lower
rate. If that would have proved too complicated, surely uniform
grants to wives would have preserved the wage-relatedness of the
family's total benefit. Either approach would have been more
"progressive" than the one proposed.
Yet, these alternative solutions raise some difficulties that
perhaps the Council wished to avoid. For example, under a family
minimum plan, determining the minimum would be a difficult
decision. The Council was aware that the cost of living and cus-
tomary cash wages varied significantly across the nation. 79 The
wide range of OAA average payments partly reflected this varia-
tion. It would probably be politically unacceptable for the federal
government to pay different Title II benefits from state to state.
Yet a uniform family minimum mi'ght have appeared either ex-
cessive in Mississippi or inadequate in California. By relying on
the husband's wage history as the basis for the wife's benefits, the
Council may have crudely approximated the interstate cost of liv-
ing variations with an apparently uniform rule. Of course, this
approach is hardly adequate for low earners in high cost states.
The alternatives to the Council's proposal probably would
have created still a different problem. Under either a family
minimum or a uniform wives' allowance, perhaps a great propor-
tion of the elderly couples eligible for Title II benefits would still
have had to apply for OAA. The 50% benefit proposal, therefore,
7' See generally, H. & A. Somers, Recent Developments and Emerging Concepts, in W. HABER
& W. COHEN, supra note 20, at 54-56 (trend away from individual wage loss compensation
towards family benefit).
"' See 1938 ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 60, at 21 (differences in OAA and




may have wisely concentrated Social Security payments on those
with the best chance of surviving on "earned" pensions alone. Al-
though inconsistent with the principle of serving the greatest
need, the Council nonetheless implied such a justification:
"[w]hile, in some cases, it will be necessary to supplement insur-
ance benefits by assistance grants despite any reasonable en-
hancement of early benefit payments, it is sound public policy to
reduce this overlap considerably." 8 0
Of course, it is unclear whether these difficulties affected the
Council's ultimate solution. Perhaps it could not untrack its collec-
tive mind from the notion that benefits received should be based
upon contributions. Or maybe the Council simply saw the political
handwriting on the wall. Other explanations may emerge from an
examination of the other Council proposals for dependents' ben-
efits.
b. Survivors' Benefits. The Council's wives' benefit proposal set
a pattern for the others: The Council grafted social adequacy fac-
tors on to the Social Security individual equity approach by keying
dependents' benefits to the wage history of the breadwinner.
Social Security death benefits were initially intended solely to
reflect a measure of individual equity when persons died before
they had recouped benefits roughly equal to their own-and their
employers'-contributions.8l Although one can quarrel with the
sensibility of this particular form of "life insurance," it neverthe-
less saved workers without dependents the expense of paying
"premiums" for those with dependents. Moreover, the latter could
always voluntarily provide additional protection for their sur-
vivors. If not originally so, it soon became obvious that many
workers did not provide adequately for their survivors through
life insurance or other arrangements.
Although survivors were, of course, eligible for other forms
of "welfare," 82 the Council now considered these inadequate.
Mothers' pensions, which had by then become ADC benefits,
might have been less demeaning than general relief, but were still
considered relief. As with wives' benefits, the Council concluded
80 Id.
8" See text accompanying note 29 supra.
82 Poor surviving young children and their mothers were eligible for Title IV benefits,
and in 1937-38, 43% of the ADC caseload constituted families in which the father was
dead. 1938 ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 60, at 30. Presumably, in most cases the
father had been a worker at the time of his death (or prior to retirement if death occurred
thereafter). In September 1938, the average ADC payment was about $32 per month. Id.
Similarly, surviving poor widows were eligible for state Old Age Assistance programs once
they reached age sixty-five.
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that it was socially preferable to pay for need through social in-
surance rather than through public assistance.
83
One solution would have been to allow a worker to elect
either his anticipated personal annuity or lower individual benefits
with actuarially equivalent survivor benefits added. The survivor
benefits alternative might even have been imposed on family
heads. Alternatively, the existing death benefit could have been
substantially increased and made payable in a lump sum or as an
annuity, depending upon whether the worker had dependents.
All of these proposals would have maintained horizontal equity
among single workers, those who would have left dependent
widows of varying ages, and those who would have left dependent
children.
The Council instead proposed that workers with dependent
survivors receive more than those without because their families
needed it more.84  Payment of uniform minimum amounts for
each dependent survivor would have been a logical extension of
this theory. Such a scheme would have amounted to payment,
through the Social Security system, of a nationalized ADC benefit
schedule for deceased worker families with young children, and a
nationalized OAA benefit schedule for elderly widows of workers.
But as in the case of wives' benefits, the Council rejected this ap-
proach in favor of payments "related to the normal income of the
deceased wage earner." 85
This proposal is easily understood as it related to aged
widows. The Council could not urge a 50% benefit for aged wives
and then call for a shift to a flat sum per month when they be-
come widows. Indeed, the proposed elderly widows' benefit of
75% of the husband's benefit plainly was designed to leave the
widow with half of the couple's combined amount when he was
alive.86 I will not quarrel with the Council's attempt to maintain
aged widows' standards of living.
'3 "Above all, the relief method is not the most desirable way of meeting childhood
dependency. Social insurance offers an improved method of dealing with the problem." Id.
84 In effect, this proposal imposed a 100% estate tax on the value of survivor bene-
fits on workers without dependents. No estate tax was imposed on the value of benefits
when dependent survivors claimed them. However, the 100% rate and the unavailability of
either earlier spending, gift-giving or charitable contribution alternatives weakens this
analogy to the estate tax.
85 Id. at 31.
86 The Council also proposed that widows under age sixty-five at the time of their
husbands' death receive wage-related pensions once they reached age sixty-five. This did
not follow obviously from the wives' benefit rule. One reason for the minimum age re-
quirement for widow's benefits may have been Congress' expectation that widows would
live with their married children. See J. BROWN, supra note 32, at 142.
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When it considered benefits for dependent children, how-
ever, the Council should have considered whether all surviving
children deserve similar benefits or public transfers designed to
keep them in the same relative economic position. But the Council
never recognized the issue, and its unexplained proposal that sur-
vivor's benefits correspond to the deceased's wages is difficult to
justify. One could argue that such benefits approximate what the
survivors would have received if each deceased father had made
an informed decision to buy insurance. Those with higher wages
would probably have bought more coverage. But they would have
had to pay more for it. The Council candidly admitted, however,
that the employer's share would largely finance dependents' ben-
efits at the expense of a reduction in retirement and death ben-
efits for single workers.87 Thus, the proposed addition of
wage-related survivors' benefits amounted to a horizontal income
transfer by increasing benefits for all workers with families at the
expense of all workers without families. 88 If the Council thought
it necessary to decrease pension and death benefits for single per-
sons to promote social adequacy, however, why did it not concen-
trate on those who needed it most-especially since the Council
also envisioned funding some portion of the dependents' benefits
with general tax revenues? 89
Plainly, the Council thought its position favored families-
particularly families with children. But its proposal did not uni-
formly reflect this position, because it favored some survivor
children over other survivoiv children. In addition, although its
proposal brought many dependent survivor children onto the So-
cial Security rolls it also left many other children on the ADC
rolls. Most of these "stranded" children had fathers living outside
the household who refused or were unable to support their chil-
dren. The Council did not reveal whether it paid any attention to
this class of children. Certainly it did not explain why its proposal
treated children with fathers that failed to pay child support less
favorably than children with deceased fathers who had failed to
'7 See 1938 ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 60, at 29.
88 See id. at 44. The Council itself stated that "'Survivors' protection in the event of the
early death of a wage earner with young children is the counterpart of the protection of
the wage earner and his aged wife or widow should he live to retirement after his children
are grown." Id. at 30.
89 Id. The Council had models for its proposed benefit structure. For example, in 1925
Paul Douglas proposed a social welfare system to assure that a workingman's family would
not live in poverty; his allowance scheme would not only have provided uniform amounts
per child of low income earners, but also have phased out the benefit for those receiving
high wages. See P. DouGLs, WAGES AND THE FANiLY 211-12, 220-23 (2d ed. 1927).
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obtain adequate life insurance. 90 Moreover, even if the Advisory
Council regarded children with deceased fathers more deserving,
it apparently did not consider the stigma that might attach to the
children left on ADC after others had been "elevated" to Social
Security.91
There is, of course, a straightforward explanation for the
omission of children with able-bodied but nonsupporting fathers.
The advisors favored dependents of deceased, elderly and dis-
abled workers because of the breadwinner's inability to work. 92
Able-bodied men who did not pay child support for other reasons
represented a different problem to the Council. Yet, to the de-
pendent child, the effects were the same.
93
2. Action on the Advisory Council Recommendations: Endorsement
by the Administration
On December 30, 1938, less than three weeks after the Ad-
visory Council issued its report, Chairman Altmeyer sent the Pres-
ident and Congress a report from the Social Security Board pro-
posing changes in the Social Security Act.94 Although this report
contained recommendations for many programs covered by the
1935 Act, its old age insurance proposals were patterned on the
Advisory Council's report.
95
90 The Council did propose Title II protection for another class of ADC
beneficiaries-children and families with disabled ,vorkers. Records in 1938 indicated that
25% of ADC families had incapacitated breadwinners. Soc. SEC. BULL., Jan. 1939, at 7.
Although the Council agreed that disabled workers and their families should receive Title
II benefits, many of its members were so concerned about costs and administration that no
proposal emerged. See 1938 ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 60, at 32-35.
91 Similarly, the Council seemingly ignored the possibility that additional stigma could
fall on recipients of Old Age Assistance when those who would otherwise have received
both Social Security and Old Age Assistance survived on Social Security alone.
92 See Cohen, Twenty-Five Years of Progress in Social Security, in W. HABER & W. COHEN,
supra note 20, at 87-88.
" Other aspects of the Council's proposals are noteworthy. It proposed that mothers
who stayed at home and cared for children who were entitled to dependents' benefits
should receive additional benefits of their own. 1938 ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra
note 60, at 31. These widows with young children were not seen as deserving in their own
right; rather, their entitlements flowed from their children. See id. (payments to widow to
cease upon last child attaining age limit for eligibility). It is also noteworthy that the Coun-
cil did not propose any specific wage-related formula for surviving children and their
mothers, even though it did urge specific percentages for elderly wives and widows. Nor
did it discuss whether a maximum should be imposed on family benefits.
'4 See SOCIAL SECURITY BOARD, A REPORT OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY BOARD TO THE PRES-
IDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES (1938), reprinted in Soc. SEC. BULL.,
Jan. 1939, at 4 [hereinafter cited as BOARD REPORT].
95 A. ALTMEYER, supra note 59, at 96.
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Like the Council, the Board justified the wife's benefit as an
attempt to deal with the presumptively greater need of retirees
with elderly wives. 96 It offered no explanation for why payments
were tied to the husband's benefit rather than providing either a
minimum family guarantee or a uniform sum to wives. The
Board merely emphasized the importance of distinguishing
wage-related pensions provided by Title II from individual need-
based pensions provided by Title I.1
7
The Board also rested its recommendation for survivor ben-
efits to elderly widows, younger mothers, and children on pre-
sumptive need. It emphasized the importance of paying annuities
to dependents instead of a lump sum to the estates of workers
with or without dependents.9 8 The Board did not propose a
specific formula for determining survivors' benefits. Moreover, its
report did not clearly favor wage-related survivors' benefits.99
Unlike the Advisory Council, the Social Security Board
examined more than Social Security questions. It called for in-
creased federal aid to state ADC programs. 100 Here, the Board
did not find ADC stigmatizing. Rather, it argued that not enough
states had adopted ADC programs and that many were in-
adequately financed.ioi It proposed legislation to strengthen
ADC rather than abolish the need for it. In its discussion of Title
IV changes, the Board made no reference to the expected impact
of its proposals for Title 11.102 President Roosevelt, in his
January 16, 1939 message to Congress endorsing the Board's re-
port, did however, point to the "two-fold" approach to the needs
of dependent children- Social Security survivor benefits for de-
ceased workers as well as increased federal aid to state ADC pro-
grams.1 0 3  Neither the President nor the Board seemed to find
anything odd about this division in the treatment of needy chil-
dren.
96 The Board was enthusiastic about future employment for wives. See BOARD REPORT,
supra note 94, at 6. Since wives' benefit rights based on earnings would eventually increase,
the cost of providing a supplement for dependent wives could decrease. Id.
97 Id. at 5.
98 Id. at 7.
9' See id.
100 Id. at 16.
101 See id. By the end of 1938, only 42 states had approved ADC programs. See Statistics
for the United States for December, 1938, Soc. SEC. BULL., Feb. 1939, at 64.
102 See Proposed Changes in the Social Security Act, Soc. SEC. BULL., Jan. 1939, at 16.
103 See PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO CONGRESS TRANSMITTING A REPORT OF THE SOCIAL SE-
CURITY BOARD RECOMMENDING CHANGES IN THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT, H.R. Doc. No. 110,
76th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1939).
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C. The Congressional Process
1. The House
The House Ways and Means Committee began hearings on
the 1939 Amendments on February 1, 1939.104 Although public
hearings continued for many weeks with dozens of witnesses, and
produced more than 2,000 pages of testimony and papers, very
little attention was actually given to the questions under considera-
tion here.
Judged by sheer volume of testimony, the most controversial
matter before the committee was its reconsideration of the
"Townsend Plan," which Congress rejected in 1935.105 The
Townsend proposal called for universal pensions-demogrants
for the elderly retired to be paid regardless of prior earnings or
current needs. This plan was an alternative to the combination of
Old Age assistance and Old Age Insurance. The original
Townsend Plan contemplated pensions of $200 per month. By
1938 most, but not all, of its advocates were willing to support
pensions of only about $60 per month. This scheme, however,
would have provided greater benefits to the elderly than any
other proposal under consideration, and the elderly supported it
enthusiastically.10 6 Nevertheless, the Townsend Plan was de-
feated again. In fact, the wage-related nature of the dependents'
benefits proposal may have been prompted by a desire to main-
tain great distance between the worker-earned orientation of Old
Age Insurance and the uniform grant characteristics of the
Townsend proposal. If couples were guaranteed an "adequate"
minimum Old Age Insurance amount, this minimum might
apply-at least in the earlier years-to so many beneficiaries that
OAI might begin to look like a scaled-down version of the
Townsend Plan.
Still, the Committee was offered other solutions to the Advis-
ory Council dependents' benefits proposals. These alternatives
came from across the political spectrum. For example, Dr. J.
Frederic Dewhurst, an economist, submitted a booklet prepared
by the Committee on Old Age Security of the Twentieth Century
Fund, entitled, "A Program for Action." It recommended that
wives' without Social Security accounts of their own receive ben-
104 A. ALTMEYER, supra note 59, at 99.
'05 For a discussion of the Townsend Plan and the Lundeen Bill for Unemployment
Insurance, another proposal from the "left" that also failed in 1935, see P. DOUGLAS, supra
note 69, at 69-83.
.06 See generally A. HOLTZMAN, THE TOWNSEND MOVEMENT: A POLITICAL STUDY (1963).
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efits of $15 per month beginning at age sixty. Widows would get
the amounts that their retired spouses received before death.
1 0 7
Jacob Baker, President of the United Federal Workers, speaking
on behalf of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, called for
increasing minimum Old Age Insurance payments to the aged by
$20 per month for single' individuals, and $30 per month for
couples, with unspecified extra benefits for additional depen-
dents.10 8 Dr. Abraham Epstein, Executive Secretary of the
American Association for Social Security and a leading writer in
the field of economic security, also urged that dependents' ben-
efits go to those with the greatest need. Complaining that too
many Old Age Insurance benefits would go to those not in
need,10 9 he proposed limiting the program entirely to those earn-
ing less than $3,000 (or perhaps $5,000) per year.110 For them,
Epstein would have provided elderly wives' and widows' ben-
efits.11 He proposed, however, that surviving children receive
benefits from a strengthened Aid to Dependent Children pro-
gram.1 2  Merryle S. Rukeyser, on behalf of the Social Security
Commission, established by the Hearst newspapers, recommended
that an employee be allowed to elect a reduced annuity for him-
self supplemented by an annuity payable to his spouse."
3
The Committee appeared to give little consideration to these
proposals. Nearly all witnesses who addressed the issue favored
the principle of adding dependents' benefits to Title 11.114 In-
deed, what Congressman would oppose old ladies, widows and
orphans? The only serious debate over the wives' and survivors'
benefits came during the testimony of Dr. Altmeyer. The Com-
107 See Hearings Relative to the Social Security Act Amendments of 1939 Before the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 76th Cong., Ist Sess. 810 (1939) [hereinafter cited as Ways and
Means Committee Hearings].
108 Id. at 1477 (statement of Jacob Baker).
109 Id. at 1015-16 (statement of Abraham Epstein).
110 Id. In 1935, the Committee on Economic Security also recommended exempting
nonmanual workers earning more than $250 per month from Title II. See COMMITTEE ON
ECONOMIC SECURITY, supra note 13, at 211. This proposal was rejected.
"I Ways and Means Committee Hearings, supra note 107, at 1058.
112 Id.
"1 Id. at 1858 (statement of Merryle Rukeyser). The testimony of professional social
welfare representatives is also revealing. They talked exclusively of improving the ADC
program through increased federal funding, and ignored the proposed shift of many ADC
beneficiaries to the Social Security program. See, e.g., id. at 1316 (testimony of Paul T.
Beisser, President of the Child Welfare League of America); id. at 1319 (testimony of Wil-
liam Hodson, New York City Commissioner of Welfare, on behalf of the American Associ-
ation of Social Workers); id. at 1327 (testimony of D. S. Howard, researcher for the Rus-
sell Sage Foundation, also on behalf of the American Association of Social Workers).
114 See, e.g., id. at 1773 (statement of Edwin Witte).
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mittee cross-examined Altmeyer at some length about the fairness
of favoring workers with families over those without. The pro-
posal to replace the lump sum death benefit provisions of the
1935 Act with survivors' benefits seemed to bother Congressman
McCormack: "In other words, John Jones, who has been in the
system and who has $500 to his credit when he dies, who is single
and has no widow, nobody eligible-that then goes into the
fund?" 115 When Altmeyer said that it would, the Congressman
replied, "In other words it is a form of tontine fund?" "Well, it
isn't that," Altmeyer protested, "It is getting away from the sav-
ings principle and to the insurance principle." This response
made little sense. Although the 1935 provisions had been billed as
a savings plan, the lifetime annuity feature already made Title II
primarily an insurance scheme. A tontine is also an insurance
plan, although perhaps Altmeyer thought the word pejorative. He
would not, however, acknowledge that a single person might pre-
fer a larger individual annuity to any kind of survivors' insurance.
Instead, he asserted that the Title II proposals gave all workers
"more by way of overall protection." 116
Congressman Cooper observed that enactment of the pro-
posals would mean that "Congress, through the exercise of its dis-
cretion, has decided that this other group [survivors] that did not
pay the benefits are more entitled to be taken care of than the
estates of these people [those without dependents] who paid in
the taxes." 117 Dr. Altmeyer again objected, arguing that it was
inaccurate to say that "widows and orphans do not pay for those
benefits," and second, that it did not create an "inequity to the
single person because ... [the] schedule of benefits for the single
person ... is equal to or in excess of the protection he could
purchase from a private insurance company." 118 These state-
ments are inconsistent: If the wage earner's own benefits at least
equal what he is entitled to in return for his taxes, how can he or
his dependents also pay for the additional benefits his survivors
receive? Perhaps sensing this contradiction Altmeyer returned to
the insurance package theme: "I don't think you can really think
in terms of single men and married men ... because-the single
man does not know whether he is going to be single all his life,
when he starts out .... So it is a family concept. You just cannot
think of these people as individuals. You have to think of them in
115 Id. at 2179.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 2197.
"1 Id. at 2197-98.
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family relationships."1' Later, Congressman McCormack
chimed in: "[with] private insurance I have the option of taking
out any kind of insurance I want to. Under this [Title II pro-
posals] I have no option." 120 Altmeyei- simply responded that the
Title II "policy" provisions ought to provide compulsory survivors'
benefits because that would best serve most of the 130,000,000
potential beneficiaries.
121
1 Although the Social Security Board and the Advisory Coun-
cil based their proposals on a social adequacy rationale, Altmeyer
did not argue that the program further abandon the principle of
individual equity. Rather, he emphasized the concept of a single
comprehensive insurance policy. Perhaps as a result of this line of
argument, the Congressmen did not question whether the pro-
posals treated the dependents of low wage earners less fairly than
those of high wage earners. At no point during Altmeyer's tes-
timony did the Committee discuss the appropriateness of provid-
ing dependents' with benefits equal to a percentage of the wage
earner's primary benefit amount. Congressman Reed, however,
submitted two particularly revealing written questions to Dr.
Altmeyer. Question: "Why should payments to widows and or-
phans not be limited to needy cases?" Answer:
The whole object of Title II ... has been to provide protection
upon a basis of right and to eliminate the necessity of applying
the means test to each recipient. However, since benefits pay-
able to low-wage earners are larger in relation to the wage loss,
presumptive or probable need is taken into consideration.
122
The latter statement, although true, was disingenuous. Although
dependents of a low wage earner would receive a greater percen-
tage of his wages, they would receive less money than would de-
pendents of a higher wage earner. Thus, Altmeyer continued to
imply that widows and orphans of higher wage earners needed
greater benefits than did those of lower wage earners. The word
"need," however, ordinarily refers to some uniform minimum.
Perhaps Altmeyer assumed that because poor people were accus-
tomed to little, those with higher incomes would sustain greater
psychological injury if they had to survive on the minimum.
Congressman Reed also asked, "[c]ould there be a limitation
of the payment of widows' pensions and orphans' pensions to per-
119 Id. at 2199.
120 Id. at 2208.
121 Id. at 2209.
122 Id. at 2299.
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sons in low-income groups?"123 Altmeyer answered that "[t]his
limitation could not be made without destroying the contributory
principle or denying benefits to the higher-income groups who
had already made contributions to the system." 124 But if pay-
ments are made for social adequacy reasons based on presumptive
need, as Altmeyer had stated earlier,' 25 the contributory principle
had already been compromised. Moreover, if single workers re-
ceived benefits equal to what they could have obtained through
private insurance, as Altmeyer also argued, it is hard to under-
stand how higher income employees have contributed to depen-
dents' benefits.
In sum, Dr. Altmeyer successfully defended the package of
Title II proposals with a variety of conflicting rationales. No one
in the public sessions took up the issues raised by Congressman
Reed, and the only significant change produced by the Commit-
tee's questioning was the addition of surviving dependent parents'
benefits. Congressman McCormack had argued that at least some
consideration should be given to the single worker supporting his
parents, 126 and he prevailed.
Three final points about the proposals Dr. Altmeyer de-
fended should be noted. First, when he testified, the Administra-
tion had already decided that benefit amounts for surviving chil-
dren and their mothers would be 50% and 75%, respectively, of
the worker's primary benefit amount. But it offered no explana-
tion for these figures, Second, wage-related benefits for young
children of retired workers had been added to the package-also
without explanation. Perhaps early in the process no one consid-
ered the possibility that even sixty-five year-old men may need
financial help to care for minor children. Third, and most impor-
tant, the Administration's plan now included a family
maximum.
127
At the close of public testimony, the Ways and Means Com-
mittee met for six weeks in executive session and eventually re-
ported out a bill, H.R. 6635,28 which adopted the recommenda-




125 See text accompanying note 122 supra.
126 Ways and Means Committee Hearings, supra note 107, at 2209-10.
127 See notes 144-49 and accompanying text infra.
128 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939).
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In its report, the Ways and Means Committee did not
further explain its reasons for adopting the dependents' benefits
provisions. 129  It did reveal that it had rejected the Advisory
Council's proposal to commit general revenues for the payment of
benefits, and that it was content to let the Title II "trust fund"
grow at a more modest rate than a private insurer's. This break
from the original commitment to a fully-funded plan made to-
day's Title II intergenerational transfer system inevitable. 13  The
Republican minority of the Ways and Means Committee did not
criticize H.R. 6635 too harshly, 131 although it did "question the
fairness of providing ... increased benefits at the expense of
single persons and married men whose wives are under 65." 132
On June 10, 1939, after a spirited and lengthy floor debate in
which nothing of additional importance was said about the Title
II amendments, the House passed the bill by a vote of 364-2.1'3
2. The Senate
The Senate Finance Committee hearings on H.R. 6635 re-
sembled those of the Ways and Means Committee. Abraham Ep-
stein again testified against the Administration's Title II Plan,
warning "you will be throwing out millions of dollars on people
who are not social problems." 134 But his plea fell on deaf ears;
the Senate Committee endorsed all the important aspects of H.R.
6635 that dealt with Title II benefits.
135
129 See H.R. REP. No. 728, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939). The Committee added a few
provisions -dependent parent's benefits and benefits for children of retirees-not rec-
ommended by the Advisory Council or the Social Security Board in their reports to the
President.
130 84 CONG. REC. 6715-16 (1939).
131 See id. at 6697 (supplemental statement of Republican Minority).
132 Id. at 6699-7000.
133 See id. at 6951-71; A. ALTMEYER, supra note 59, at 106.
'34 Social Security Act Amendments of 1939: Hearings on H.R. 6635 Before the Senate Comm.
on Finance, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 190-91 (1939).
13' The Committee did take issue with the House bill by proposing that the $10 per
month individual minimum OAI benefit for a retired worker be retained. Thus, with a
wife's benefit, the couple would be assured of $15 per month. This was adopted in the Social
Security Act Amendments of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-379, § 203(a), 53 Stat. 1367 (amending
42 U.S.C. § 403 (1935)). The House bill changed the 1935 Act's $10 per month minimum
to a family minimum, which entitled retired husbands and their wives to only $10 per
month if the husband's monthly benefit was $6.67. Although the Finance Committee's
change was a trivial one that would help few people, it shows that the Committee recog-
nized that social adequacy could be improved by altering the minimum. Apparently, how-
ever, it did not consider the possibility of entirely substituting an "adequate" family
minimum for wage-related dependents' benefits.
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On the floor of the Senate, the Townsend plan was once
more the center of the debate. This time its proponents had
further diluted the plan to provide for only a $40 per month pen-
sion to every person over age sixty who was not working, regard-
less of the person's other income or wealth. This benefit level was,
however, substantially greater than what most OAI retiree house-
holds (especially those without working wives) could expect for
some time. Nevertheless, the proposed pension was not small
enough that rather than being dismissed as utopian, it could have
triggered discussion of an important policy issue: should all the
retired elderly be paid uniform pensions, or should some receive
aid from a means-tested program while others receive wage-
related amounts from a social insurance plan? If the Senate had
considered this issue, it might also have faced a parallel question:
whether dependent children should receive a Townsend-like
demogrant rather than Title II benefits in some situations and
Title IV benefits in others? But the Senate did not deal with these
questions. Most Senators were apparently satisfied that the
Townsend proposal was too costly, that the proposed financing
for it-a national value added tax-was absurd, and that most
established economists opposed it.
On July 12, 1939, the Senate passed H.R. 6635 by a vote of
57-8, without important alterations of the House's changes in
Title II. The Conference Committee soon worked out the differ-
ences between the two bills, and on August 10, 1939, President
Roosevelt signed the approved bill.
136
III
DEPENDENT CHILDREN'S BENEFITS IN 1939:
How MUCH?
Part II focused on the strategic policy decisions that shaped
the 1939 amendments to Title II, but it did not discuss the par-
ticular factors that determined the amount of the children's ben-
efit.
A. Calculation of the Principal Insurance Benefit
Although the 1939 Amendments substituted an average
monthly wage concept for the accumulated wages principle em-
bodied in the 1935 law, the new formula continued to favor early
'31 A. ALTMEYER, supra note 59, at 111-13.
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retirees and low wage earners. A retiree's average monthly wages
were calculated starting with wages earned in 1937 or at age
twenty-two, whichever came later, and continuing until age sixty-
five. 137  The formula only included the first $3,000 in annual
wages (a maximum of $250 per month). Monthly benefits
equalled the sum of (1) 40% of the average monthly wage, up to
$50, plus 10% of the average monthly wage in excess of $50; and
(2) 1% of the amount computed in the first part of the calcula-
tion multiplied by the number of years in which the worker
earned $200 or more.'
38
This formula's bias towards low wage earners is apparent. A
worker retiring in 1947 at age sixty-five with ten years of covered
wages averaging $100 per month would receive a pension of
$27.50 per month, 139 while another worker with $200 per month
in average wages would receive $38.50 per month. Thus, twice
the average wage increased the pension by only 40%.140
The bias of the 1939 formula toward early retirees is also
apparent. If a $100 per month worker retired in 1957, with
twenty, instead of ten, years of covered wages, his pension would
be $30 per month-only $2.50 per month, or about 9%, more for
ten additional years of employment. The 1939 changes even
helped early retirees without dependents; the amended formula
was more favorable to single workers who retired after ten years
'37 See Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, tit. II, § 209(f), 53 Stat. 1362.
Wages in quarters prior to 22 would count if the worker earned more than $50 in such
quarter. Id.
13' See id. § 209(e), 53 Stat. at 1375-76. The 1939 Amendments, like the 1935 law, re-
quired a certain minimum wage history before a worker could draw any retirement ben-
efits. The worker had to he "fully insured." To attain this status he had to have at least one
quarter of coverage for every two that elapsed, starting in 1937 or after he reached the age
of 21, and a minimum total of six quarters of coverage. The worker would remain "fully
insured" after he had 40 quarters of coverage. Id. § 2 0 9(g), 53 Stat. at 1376-77. The
worker was credited with a quarter of coverage for any quarter during which he earned
$50 of wages. The worker also had to be either fully insured or "currently" insured before
his family could receive any survivor benefits. To be "currently" insured a worker had to
have earned at least $50 in wages for at least six quarters out of the last twelve quarters
prior to the quarter in which he died. Id. § 209(h), 53 Stat. at 1377. The less stringent test
for currenfld insured status was especially helpful to the family of a younger deceased
worker who had had a substantial unemployment history but who had nonetheless been
working regularly for at least a year and a half prior to his death. On the other hand, the
rule with respect to survivors' benefits was not as generous as it could have been. For
example, the dependent survivors of workers killed in the course of employment are typi-
cally entitled to Workmen's Compensation benefits even if the employee had worked only
one day.
, The calculation is: (40% x S50)+(10% x $50)+(1% x 10 x $25)=$27.50.
140 The lower wage earner would have 27.5% of his wages replaced, in contrast to only
19.25% for the higher wage earner.
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or less of coverage than the 1935 formula. In accord with the
Advisory Council proposal, however, the new formula reduced
benefits for individual workers with longer years of service, espe-
cially if they also had higher earnings. For example, a worker with
$250 per month of covered wages and forty-three years of wage
credits received $85 per month-the maximum-under the orig-
inal enactment. Under the 1939 formula he became eligible for
only $57.20 per month. On the other hand, if he had a sixty-five
year-old wife, the retired couple would be entitled to $85 per
month-still the maximum under the new rules.
1 4
1
Under the 1939 Amendments, survivor benefits were deter-
mined simply by applying the retiree benefit formula that existed
when the worker died. A concept like the average monthly wage
was needed to achieve wage-related survivor benefits that were
sensibly related to need. Social policy makes it desirable not to
base the amount of a worker's life insurance (dependent annuities)
mainly on his number of years in the work force. As a result, the
family of a deceased worker would receive greater benefits under
the 1939 Amendments than it would have received under the old
accumulated wages rule.
142
B. The Child's Benefit Amount and Family Maxima
The 1939 Amendments provided a young child of a de-
ceased or retired worker a benefit equal to 50% of his father's
primary insurance benefit. Elderly wives also received 50% of the
primary insurance benefit, while elderly widows and widowed
mothers caring for young children received 75%. Although Con-
gress did not explain why it chose these particular percentages,
some justifications may be inferred.
Providing husband and wife with 150% of the benefits paid
to single beneficiaries instead of 200% probably reflects an as-
sumption about economies of scale-that two together can live
more cheaply than two alone. This rationale may also explain the
difference between the 75% benefit for widows and the 50% ben-
141 See H.R. REP. No. 728, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 84 CONG. REc. 6711, 6714
(1939). The staff proposals to the Committee on Economic Security in 1934 envisioned an
OAI program that would eventually replace an average of 40% or 50% of the earnings of
retired workers up to the maximum. See COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC SECURITY, supra note
13, at 202-03. Although the new formula clearly abandoned this goal for individual earn-
ers, it did promise a retiree with 40 years of service $100 per month or less in average
wages, and an elderly non-working wife slightly more than 50% of his covered earnings.




efit for wives. We can extend this principle to children's benefits.
If a widowed mother needs a 75% benefit, her child needs less
than that if they live together. But the 1939 Amendments contain
an anomaly: children's benefits remain at 50% regardless of fam-
ily size instead of declining to reflect greater economies of scale as
the size of the household increases. This issue must be evaluated
in light of the family maxima.
Under the 1939 formula, the maximum monthly pension an
individual worker with forty-three years of employment could
earn was $57.20.143 The $85 per month maximum established in
1935 was preserved, but it applied to the entire family-not to
the individual.144 If this were the only limit on family benefits, it
probably would have applied to only a few families, and primarily
to families with relatively high incomes. For example, this
maximum would only limit benefits for the family of a worker
who died with ten years of covered earnings of $100 per month if
he was survived by a wife and five or more children. By contrast,
if a worker with $250 per month in covered wages died after ten
years of employment, his family's benefits would reach the
maximum if he was survived by a wife and three or more chil-
dren.1
45
The 1939 changes also imposed two other family maxima,
with the proviso that the lowest of the three would govern: the
family benefits could not exceed either 200% of the worker's
primary benefit amount or 80% of his average monthly wages.
146
These additional limits affected the families of low wage-earners
more than they did the families of high wage-earners. The 80%
limit reduced the family maximum for a worker with $100 per
month in average wages from $85 to $80, and the 200% limit
reduced his family maximum even further-to $70 per month if
he had forty years to average, and to only $55 per month if he
had worked only ten years. On the other hand, the 80% rule did
not even affect the worker with maximum coverage ($250 per
month in wages) because of the $85 limit. The 200% limit would
restrict him after he had seven years of coverage, when the $85
provision would apply.
The public record reveals no discussions, debates, or expla-
nations of the various family maxima. The family maximum ex-
"" See text accompanying notes 139-41 supra.
144 Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, tit. II, § 203(a), 53 Stat. 1367.
145 Without the family maximum, they would receive $99 per month.
146 Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, tit. II, § 203(a), 53 Stat. 1367. In
no event, however, would the maximum be less than $20 per month.
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pressed in terms of 80% of average wages is, however, under-
standable. By assuring that retirees and their families suffered
some income loss upon retirement, this scheme placed a high
value on current work. It also reflected the fact that Social Se-
curity is not subject to income tax and that after retirement the
family would probably save work-related expenses. The 80% limit
is also sensible when applied to families of deceased workers. A
family's cost of living probably decreases when the wage-earner
dies because there is one less individual to support. Limiting the
family's benefits to 200% of the worker's benefit amount is, how-
ever, harder to justify. The 200% maximum accounts for
economies of scale only up to a certain family size. For example, a
family comprised of a widow and one child would receive a 125%
benefit, while a widow and three children would receive 200% by
virtue of the maximum. But the economy-of-scale justification dis-
solves when one compares the benefit percentages to survivor
families of various sizes under the 1939 Amendments with a plan
without such a maximum.
TABLE 1: SURVIVOR BENEFIT PERCENTAGES
1939 Amendments Plan with No Maximum
% Cum % % Cum %
Widow 75 75 75 75
1st Child 50 125 40 115
2nd Child 50 175 35 150
3rd Child 25 200* 30 180
4th Child 0 200* 25 205
5th Child 0 200* 20 225
6th Child 0 200* 15 240
7th Child 0 200* 10 250
8th Child 0 200*. 5 255
*Maximum
The latter plan illustrates that the 1939 rules only crudely reflect
economies of scale. In short, the 200% limit rule seems calculated
to cut off funds to large families, especially large low-income
families. It also precludes payment of full benefits to families
composed of a widow and three or more children, or a retiree, an
elderly wife and two or more children.' 47 This is difficult to jus-
' Dependents, but not workers, had their benefits reduced proportionately when the
family maximum was reached. Id. Dr. Altmeyer explained to the Ways and Means Commit-
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tify. Did Congress fear that providing higher benefits to larger
. families would stimulate large families? It seems implausible that a
few extra benefit dollars per month for those extra children
would influence a couple's decision to procreate- particularly
when the benefits would be paid only if the children were still
minors when the father died or reached age sixty-five. Perhaps
the drafters just gave up on large families, leaving them to turn to
ADC to make up Social Security's shortfall, while hoping that
smaller families could survive on the Title II benefits. They may
have considered government funding so limited that paying for
more children in larger families would result in inadequate ben-
efits for others.148  On the other hand, if Congress regarded
ADC as demeaning for the deserving families of deceased work-
ers, why would it single out large families for continued stigma?
Could it be that a government dominated by white Protestants
arrived at this result because of its perceptions of Catholics and
blacks? 149
Perhaps there is a less sinister explanation. Dr. Altmeyer em-
phasized that the proposal resembled a uniform "typical" insur-
ance policy and argued, in effect, that since most men marry,
most would want survivor benefits. Perhaps the drafters felt that
only families with two or three children were "typical," and that it
was unfair to ask all workers .to insure themselves for the needs of
more than three children. Nonetheless, this argument ignores the
concepts of social adequacy and presumptive need. Indeed, if any
dependent children could be presumed needy at the death or re-
tirement of their father, children with many siblings could. Thus,
the 200% family maximum compounded the unfairness that had
been created by the initial decision to make child benefits wage-
related.
C. The Retirement Test
In 1935, Title II was called.Old Age Insurance. But old age
alone did not entitle a worker to the pension. He had to be re-
tired as well. The Committee on Economic Security had assumed
tee the operation of the family maximum, but he never put forward a general justification
for having a maximum. Nor did he defend the particular solution proposed. House Ways
and Means Committee Hearings, supra note 107, at 2168,
148 Under the alternate pla in Table 1, for example, families with one, two and three
children fare worse than under the straight 50% rule with the 200% maximum. These two
plans might well have similar total costs.
149 Professor Brown views the 200% rule as the liberal one; but this is hard to under-
stand in light of the examples given above. See J. BROWN, supra note 32, at 145-46.
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from the outset that the purpose of the law was to provide se-
curity for the old person when he no longer was a wage-earner.
All actuarial calculations had been made on that assumption.
1 5 0
Oddly, however, the House bill contained no such require-
ment.1 5 1 The Senate Finance Committee added the requirement
that the claimant not be engaged in his customary employment
during any month in which he received benefits. The House con-
ferees accepted this readily and it became part of the law.'
52
The 1939 Amendments somewhat modified the retirement
requirement by allowing a retired worker to earn up to $15 per
month in wages without losing his full Title II pension. 53 The
1939 Amendments also dealt with two similar issues concerning
dependents' benefits. First, what should happen to the benefits of
a retiree's dependents if the retiree works? Second, what should
happen to the dependents' benefits if they work? The bill
answered the first question by providing that the wife and chil-
dren of a retiree would receive no benefits for any month in
which the retiree earned sufficient wages to lose his own ben-
efits. 154  Apparently, Congress reasoned that there is no pre-
sumptive need to justify payments to an employed worker or his
family. As a practical matter, this feature gave an elderly worker
with dependents more incentive to stop working than his single
counterpart because the "tax" on his wages in the form of lost
benefits was higher.
The bill provided that a dependent who earned more than $15
in a month lost his benefits for that month. But it penalized no-
body else; 15 other dependents and the retired worker still re-
ceived their benefits. This rule was sensible when applied to eld-
erly wives. Most would not work anyway. Those who did work
would probably earn only enough for their own maintenance. Giv-
ing such a wife a dependent's benefit would not contribute to the
social adequacy goal that such payments were designed to pro-
mote.'
56
150 E. Wr, supra note 8, at 159.
151 Professor Witte explains that Congressman Beaman objected to all proposed defini-
tions of "retired from active employment," and a Subcommittee of the Ways and Means
Committee finally agreed to strike the requirement altogether. Id.
152 Id. at 160.
... Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, tit. II, § 203(d), 53 Stat. 1367.
154 Id. § 203(e), 53 Stat. at 1367.
155 Id. § 203(d), 53 Stat. at 1367.
156 A companion rule reduced elderly wives' and widows' dependent benefits by an
amount equal to any earned benefit of their own. Id. §§ 202(b)(2), 202(d)(2), 53 Stat. at
1367. This reflects the social adequacy rationale of the Advisory Council's recommenda-
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The wisdom of applying the "retirement" test 157 to young
widows and children is less clear. Probably the drafters did not
devote much consideration to the problem of working children.
But many teenagers worked regularly, and some who attended
school undoubtedly had jobs that paid $15 per month, at least in
the summer. 158 The soundness of denying children benefits be-
cause of their own earned income is debatable. On one hand, the
working child contributes to the family income and helps pay for
his needs, thus reducing the family's need for benefits. The rule
might also be seen as a way of encouraging self-enforcement of
child labor laws. On the other hand, the child may be working to
finance his education, or to otherwise prepare for his future, and
it is not at all clear that such an investment should be hampered.
Moreover, because working children would tend to come from
poor families, the benefit reduction scheme affected families re-
gressively. 5 9 Nevertheless, the 1939 Amendments subjected
children to the $15 per month rule.
160
The most curious aspect of the retirement test is the way it
treated the earnings of widowed mothers. 161  Because Congress
provided benefits to a young widow to assure the family sufficient
income to allow her to stay at home and care for her children,
Congress understandably would take away her benefits when she
tions. Elderly couples were presumed to be less needy to the extent that the woman had
built up an account of her own. Of course, it also had the practical effect of giving many
couples no pension bonus for the woman's work. See House Ways and Means Committee Hear-
ings, supra note 107, at 2170 (statement of A. Altmeyer).
157 The statutory language does not refer to retirement. See Social Security Act
Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, tit. II, § 203(d), 53 Stat. 1367. In common usage, the
provision for reducing benefits based on employment means just that. It is, of course,
awkward to speak of a "retirement" test when referring to young mothers, and in fact, it is
an earned income test.
15 Under the 1939 Amendments, children's benefits for 16 and 17 year olds were re-
stricted to those who regularly attended school. See id. § 203(d)(2), 53 Stat. at 1367.
159 Whether reductions for children's wages were enforced is not entirely clear. Section
203(g) imposed a duty on the recipient to report circumstances that would result in a
benefit reduction. A knowing failure to report triggered a 100% penalty. Id. § 203(g), 53
Stat. at 1367.
160 Id. § 203(d), 53 Stat. at 1367.
161 It appears from reading Section 202(e) of the Act that the mother would not be
entitled to Widow's Current Insurance Benefits when she and the child were living apart
from the father when he died, because it provided that she had to be living with the
worker at the time of his death. However, Section 209(n) of the Act deemed a woman to
be living with her husband not only if they shared the same household but also if she was
either receiving support contributions from him or he had been ordered by a court to
contribute to her support. This did, however, seem to exclude the woman who had just
separated from her husband and who had not arranged for support from him, or a court
order for such support, before he died.
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went to work. But under the 1939 Amendments, no matter how
much she earned, her children continued to be fully entitled to
their benefits. a6 2  This clearly was not the rule in ADC. Indeed,
Congress emphasized in 1939 that the states must take the income
of the mother into account in making ADC awards. 1 63  The
drafters did not want Title II to incorporate a demeaning means
test. But Congress could have adopted a rule of thumb no more
offensive than the $15 per month rule-such as whether the
mother had full-time employment or whether she earned $100
per month. Perhaps Congress simply assumed that few mothers
who went to work could earn enough to support their children as
well as themselves. In 1939, this may have been true. 164  Proba-
bly, however, Congress never seriously considered the issue.
162 Under the 1939 rules, if the family received the maximum, the mother's employ-
ment would not result in greater benefits for her children. The reduction for the
maximum was applied before the retirement test reduction. Id. § 203(a), 53 Star. at 1367.
163 See id. § 401(b), 53 Stat. at 1379-80.
164 During the Senate debate, Senator Downey of California, a Townsend supporter,
attacked the wives' benefit provision because it required the wife to be too old-age sixty-
five-to claim it. Downey was concerned that because many men were married to younger
women, their wives would be unfairly excluded from the program. The Advisory Council
recognized that retirees with non-working wives younger than they could be as needy as
retirees with wives age sixty-five and older. Nonetheless, it proposed restricting the wives'
benefit to women age sixty-five and older, because without such a restriction, an unfair
inequality among women would be created; many wives would draw benefits at an earlier
age than women with their own retirement accounts-who could not begin to receive ben-
efits until they reached age sixty-five. This "inequality" argument is not so obviously com-
pelling. The wife's benefit provided money to relieve presumptive need. If the wives' ben-
efit had no age requirement, a retired man with a younger wife who stayed at home would
receive her 50% benefit. Since his earnings would have presumably been their only income,
they would need 150% of his benefit to support them both. Senator Downey observed that
if the wife worked, she would presumably not need the extra benefit and the bill would
disqualify her from the wives' benefit for each month in which she earned $15 or more. If
she had-worked in the past, but was not working when he retired, she would receive the
wife's benefit until she reached age sixty-five. See 84 CONG. REC. 9010-23 (1939). At that
time she would begin to receive her own benefit and perhaps some of her wife's benefit.
See note 156 supra. All of these results seem harmonious with the purposes of the 1939
Amendments. But the wife would be able to stop working and draw benefits before age
sixty-five and the working single woman could not.
The Advisory Council may have been concerned about providing money for social
adequacy reasons that would entice women to drop out of the labor force. Applying a test
of "able-bodiedness" to decide whether younger women needed the 50% aid would defeat
the Council's purpose of avoiding a demeaning needs-based test. To avoid this problem,
the bill, in effect, presumed" that wives could and would work between their husband's
retirement and their 65th birthday. This is ironic, because wives' benefits were grounded
on the assumption that few women were working and building retirement accounts of their
own. Widow's benefits were distributed according to the same theory: they could claim if
they were age sixty-five or cared for a dependent child. But a childless widow received no
benefits between her husband's death and her own sixty-fifth birthday. Again, this struc-
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DEPENDENT CHILDREN'S BENEFITS 1940-1980
Between 1940 and 1980, Congress has amended Title II
numerous times. The changes in the Social Security program re-
flect some important policy shifts, and have added much complex-
ity. Nonetheless, the basic principles of Social Security have not
changed since 1939.
A. Covered Children
One major change in Social Security since 1939 has been the
increased scope of its coverage. Originally, OAI covered only
employees in private industry. 165 Since 1939, Congress has ex-
tended the Act's coverage on a compulsory or voluntary basis to
self-employed persons (including professionals), most farm and
domestic workers, many government employees, emplloyees of
non-profit and religious organizations,' 66 and others. As a result,
Title II also covers more children. Beginning in 1958, the Act
provided benefits to children and other dependents of eligible
disabled workers, according them the same general status as chil-
dren of retired workers.'6 7 After 1958, many families that had
previously relied on ADC when the father became incapacitated
could instead claim under Title II. Providing benefits for depen-
dents of disabled recipients immediately qualified about 180,000
persons for Social Security.168 Today, children of disabled bene-
ture effectively presumes that she will work during those years, and would be enticed away
from work if a benefit were available. Indeed, the Advisory Council asserted that most
younger widows without dependent children "re-enter employment." Congress failed to
consider whether widows of this "in between" age could find employment. The Board had
recommended that widows in this category be given temporary aid to help them recover
from their husbands' death and to find work. See Ways and Means Committee
Hearings, supra note 107, at 2170. See also Soc. SEC. BULL., Jan. 1939, at 7. This lesser
concern for women who did not have children in their care and who were not yet age
sixty-five reflected the OAA and ADC pattern then in effect. It is still reflected in the
AFDC and SSI picture today.
1.5 See A. MUNNELL, supra note 6, at 158-59.
166 Id.
167 Between 1956 and 1960, one long-term objective of the 1938 Advisory Council was
realized: benefits were finally extended to totally and permanently disabled workers. Id. at
158-160, 164-65.
168 Schottland, Social Security Amendments of 1958: A Summary and Legislative History, Soc.
SEC. BULL., Oct. 1958, at 7.
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ficiaries constitute a significant portion of Title II's child bene-
ficiary population.
1 69
When Congress amended Title II, allowing children of the
disabled to "escape" Title IV, it gave no special consideration to
those who remained. 170  After the adoption of Social Security dis-
ability benefits, most Title IV recipients were: (1) children who
were not supported by their father, because he had divorced or
deserted the children's mother, or (2) children whose fathers had
died or become disabled without having compiled adequate earn-
ings records. 171  In short, Congress continued to subject the chil-
dren in the most difficult family situations and who were most
likely to be needy to a program that the public increasingly
viewed as demeaning.
Before 1960, many of these children fared even worse. State
or county officials often denied a child aid because they disap-
proved of some characteristic of his mother's, such as her dating
behavior or race. 172  The "good mother" requirements of the
Mothers' Pension era were not .yet extinguished; the federal gov-
ernment did not yet require states to give alternate aid to children
who lost ADC because of a perceived flaw in their mother's
character.1 73  Congress finally changed this in 1960.1
74
B. Child Benefits
1. Changes in Calculating the Principal Insurance Amount
Under Social Security, a worker's principal insurance
benefit-now called the Principal Insurance Amount (PIA)-
remains wage-related. The calculation of the retirement pension
has changed repeatedly, however, and the current rules differ
markedly from those enacted in 1939. Inflation and rising real
wages have required continual adjustment in the PIA formula.
169 Of about five million recipients of children's benefits at the end of 1978, about a
million and a half were children of the disabled. Quarterly Statistics, Soc. SEC. BULL., June,
1979, at 86 (table Q-9).
170 See Schottland, supra note 168, at 3.
171 For example, by 1969 just over 70% of AFDC cases involved fathers absent because
of marital break-up or because they never married the child's mother. See U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, FINDINGS OF THE AFDC 1971 STUDY (Pub. No. (SRS)
72-03756, 1972). By 1977, such families comprised 84.7% of the AFDC caseload. See note
227 infra.
172 See generally W. BELL, supra note 40, ch. VI; Note, Welfare's "Condition X," 76 YALE
L.J. 1222, 1230-31 (1967).
173 W. BELL, supra note 40, at 73-74; Note, supra note 172, at 1223-24.
174 Act of May 8, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-31 § 4(b), 75 Stat. 75 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
604(b) (1976)). See generally King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
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Since 1950, Social Security planners have had to cope with two
related problems: (1) providing those already retired on Social
Security with sufficient income to avoid the dole, and (2) assuring
that current workers accumulate enough wage credits to avoid
that same plight in the future. These problems have been particu-
larly acute since the mid-1960's.
Congress has taken three steps in an attempt to solve these
problems. First, it increased the tax rate to generate more revenue
for the system.' 7 5  The rate climb has been relentless, reaching
4.95% in 1977.176 Fearing Social Security bankruptcy at the end
of 1977, Congress voted to implement a further rate hike in 1978,
even though earlier legislation contemplated no increase in the
total OASDI rate until 2011. Both employers and employees are
now scheduled to pay a tax of 6.2% by 1990 1 77-about 25% more
than previously planned. These increases were defended as neces-
sary to keep the Title II program afloat. As early as 1978, how-
ever, Congress considered reducing some of the 1977 tax in-
creases. 
178
Second, Congress increased the annual maximum amount of
covered earnings. As workers have earned more, more annual
wages have been both subject to the payroll tax and counted to-
ward retirement credits. Various amendments increased the
maximum amount of annual covered wages from $3,000 to
$3,600 in 1950, and then to $4,800 in 1965. Increases since then
have been more dramatic. The 1972 amendments boosted the
maximum amount of covered earnings to $10,800,'7 and, by
1977, to $16,500.180 The 1972 changes instituted automatic fu-
ture increases in maximum wages that were tied to general wage
increases. 181 The House Ways and Means Committee estimated
175 In the 1940s, ,he planned growth in the Social Security tax rate, which had been
scheduled to jump from 1% to 2% in 1943, to 2 1/2% in 1946 and to 3% in 1949 and
thereafter, was actually retarded. The rate began its climb in 1950 and reached 3% in
1960, including a .25% amount to finance the recently-added disability benefits. See A.
MUNNEL.L, supra note 6, at 181.
176 This figure includes two components: 4.375% for OASI and .575% for DI, which
maintain separate funds. Congress also added a tax to fund the Medicare program that it
had adopted in 1965. In 1977, this tax was .9% for both employers and employees, so that
the total 1977 rate for each was 5.85%. See id. at 182.
'77 See Summary of the Conference Agreements on H.R. 9346, The Social Security Amendment of
1977, [1977] UNEMPL. INS. REP. (CCH) 15,395 [hereinafter cited as Conference Agreement].
178 See, e.g., Tackling Social Security: Is 1980 the Year of Decision?, CONG. Q., Jan. 12, 1980.
Congress earmarked all of the tax rate increase through 1980 for the disabled and their
dependents. Conference Agreement, supra note 177, at 2499-547.





that these automatic increases would double the $16,500
maximum by 1987.82 In 1977, however, Congress deemed even
this rate of increase insufficient, and scleduled the maximum to
double by 1982 and to reach $42,600 by 1987.183 This steady
climb will increase both revenues and benefit entitlements.
Finally, Congress improved the PIA calculation itself. In
1950, Congress recognized that higher post-war wages and prices
had made prior earnings credits inadequate, and passed an
amendment designed to give workers a "new start." Beginning in
1952, the worker could calculate his PIA with respect to average
monthly wages earned after 1950 only if it increased his benefits.
Further, the Amendments increased the PIA formula. The 1950
formula promised 50% of the first $100 plus 15% of the next
$200, rather than 40% of the first $50 and 10% of the next $200
as provided by the 1939 rules. 184  Finally, the 1950 changes
"gratuitously" awarded benefit increases to those already retired
and to those who would retire with pre-1950 wage records.
1 8 5
This change had a dramatic impact. The average pension paid in
1950 under the 1939 law was $26 per month; the 1950 changes
boosted that average approximately 75% to $45 per month.
186
During the next 15 years, Congress increased the PIA for-
mula modestly. In 1965, as a result of changes made in 1952,
1954 and 1958, the schedule called for benefits equal to 58.85%
of the first $110 plus 21.40% of the next $290 in average monthly
wages. 8 7  Starting in 1965, however, the benefit schedule skyroc-
keted. Following the 1972 Amendments, the PIA formula paid
more than 100% of the first $110 in average monthly wages;
moreover, an automatic cost of living adjustment was added.1 8 8 As
the formula became more generous, it became more complex.
8 9
182 See Conference Agreement, supra note 177, at 2499-548.
183 Id.
184 See A. MUNNELL, supra note 6, at 170.
185 Id. This set the pattern for the future: Congress would revise the PIA formula to
benefit both the currently retired and the retirees of the future.
186 See Cohen & Meyers, Social Security Amendments of 1950: A Summary and Legislative
History, Soc. SEC. BuLL., Oct. 1950, at 3. The 1950 changes eliminated the 1% increase in
pension amounts for additional years of service that the 1939 law had included. Id.
187 See A. MUNNELL, supra note 6, at 170.
188 See id. at 169-70.
189 As a result, effective June 1976, the PIA formula provided that benefits would be
137.77% of the first $110 in average monthly wages, plus 50.11% of the next $290, plus
46.83% of the next $150, plus 55.04% of the next $100, plus 30.61% of the next $100,
plus 25.51% of the next $250, plus 22.98% of the next $175, plus 21.28% of the next $100.
Id. Because no worker who was retired at the start of 1976 could have more than $613
in average monthly earnings, only the first four steps of the formula applied at that time.
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Congress provided that these formula changes were to oper-
ate retrospectively. With each change, retirees have had their
PIAs recalculated on the new formula and have immediately re-
ceived larger checks. Similarly, workers retiring after each change
have had the new formula applied to "covered" wages earned
prior to the formula change.
a. The "Decoupling" Problem. These changes produced some
interesting results. Congress intended each change in the benefit
formula to provide retired people with cost of living increases.
The original promise of Title II, even after the 1939 changes, was
that a retired worker would receive more than if he had invested
his Social Security taxes in private annuities. Many people, how-
ever, understood that promise to assume a non-inflationary world.
From this perspective, it seemed only fair that as the purchasing
power of the dollar declined Title II benefits would increase. Up-
ward adjustments in the PIA formula have done this. Workers
who retired years ago now receive pensions far larger than the
highest wages they ever earned. These cost-of-living increases
demonstrate what a good "deal" Social Security has been. The
owners of private fixed dollar annuities, by contrast, have no such
increases. Variable annuities or mutual- funds do not have fixed
returns, but they subject investors to the volatile securities mar-
kets.' 9 0
Congress passed cost-of-living increases, in part, to allow as
many retirees as possible to support themselves with Title II
grants instead of "welfare." But the increase in the PIA formula
for future retirees, combined with increasing wages and the in-
crease in the maximum for covered wages, produced unintended
results. Over the years, Congress increased covered wages not
only to collect more taxes but also to make a worker's lifetime
average monthly wage rise with both real wages and inflation. In
1974, however, critics began to suggest that wages that were in-
creased to account for rising prices were multiplied by a benefit
formula that had also been increased to account for the same in-
crease in prices.' 9' This phenomenon became known as "double
190 Moreover, most private pension plans have little or no post-retirement cost of living
increases. See Skolnick, supra note 24, at 13-14. For discussions of Social Security as a good
investment see R. MYERS, supra note 21, at 208-17; Ozawa, Income Redistribution and Social
Security, 50 Soc. SERVICE REV. 209 (1976); Ozawa, Individual Equity versus Social Adequacy in
Federal Old-Age Insurance, 48 Soc. SERVICE REV. 24 (1974).
191 SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, SOCIAL SECURITY AMENDMENTS OF 1977, S. REP. No. 95-




indexing." For a while, keying increases in final wage replacement
percentages to rising wages could be justified as promoting the
intent of Title II's framers to improve wage replacement rates
over time. By the mid-1970's, however, many regarded this policy
as too expensive and generous.
1 92
In 1977, Congress "decoupled" the system by separating
cost-of-living adjustments to a worker's benefits from the PIA cal-
culation made at the time benefits are first determined.1 93 Under
the old plan, a worker's actual wages since 1950 were averaged,
leaving out his five lowest earning years. The resulting average
monthly wage (AMW) was plugged into the ever-increasing PIA
formula. Under the new law, a worker's wage record is first "up-
dated" or indexed to reflect general increases in average wages
since his wages were earned. For example, if the average worker's
wages today are $12,000 and average wages in 1957 were $4,000,
indexing would triple any worker's covered wages for 1957. Once
all past years have been indexed, the worst five years axe dis-
carded and average indexed monthly earnings (AIME) are deter-
mined. This amount is then applied to a new PIA formula.
194
The new PIA formula, like the old one, is weighted in favor
of low wage-earners. But the numbers are quite different. Under
the new formula, PIA equals 90% of the first $180 of AIME plus
32% of the next $905 of AIME plus 15% of the remainder.1 95
Moreover, Congress intended these percentages, unlike the old
ones, to remain fixed. On the other hand, the "bend points" will
automatically increase to keep pace with wages. For example, the
90% step will eventually apply to more than the first $180 in
AIME.' 96 This system maintains a progressive benefit structure
In such a program wages of $100 would produce a benefit of $50. If wages and
prices both rise by 10 percent, the individual who is on the benefit rolls will
have his benefit increased to $55 and the person who is still working will have
his $100 wage increased to $110. If the benefit formula is left unchanged, both
individuals would qualify for a $55 benefit. But under present procedures the
benefit formula is also increased to 55 percent and the person who will retire in
the future with wages increased from $100 to $110 will get a benefit of $60.50.
Id.
d'9 By the year 2000, a retiring worker with average earnings would have a 52% wage
replacement rate as a percentage of final wages, and a lower earner would have a 75%
rate. The projections were for a 65% rate for the average earner and 106% rate for the
low earner by the 2040. Id. at 20.
193 See Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, 91 Stat. 1527 (amend-
ing 42 U.S.C. § 402 (1976)); Conference Agreement, supra note 177, at 2499-548.
194 See SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 191, at 17-25.




and tries to fix the wage replacement rate prospectively at approx-
imately 43% of final wages for those with average covered wages,
at 55% for those with low earnings and at 30% for those with
high earnings.
19 7
In sum, the 1977 Amendments changed the Social Security
benefit calculation in two ways: (1) by applying cost-of-living ad-
justments to retirees only and (2) by adopting the new benefit
formula. The savings to the Social Security fund from these two
changes are considerable.
1 9 8
b. Dependents in a Decoupled World. For dependents of retired
and other disabled or deceased workers, the consequences of
these changes are essentially the same as they are for retirees
themselves. Although Congress repealed the double indexing
provisions of the old law that it considered excessively generous in
determining initial benefits, dependents continue to receive in-
creases as the cost of living increases.
For dependents of workers who die or are disabled at a young
age, however, the 1977 law made a dramatic change. The old
formula averaged actual wages. As wages and the maximum in
covered wages increased, the system increasingly favored young
workers and their families. A fifty year-old worker or his depen-
dents might have to average in many years of relatively low earn-
ings from the 1950s, while survivors of a younger worker or a
younger disabled worker and his dependents had only more re-
cent, higher wage-years included in the average. Thus, the AMW
of the latter group was greater and they received a higher PIA
and higher dependent's benefits. The 1977 Amendments cured
this "injustice" by adopting the indexed wage plan.' 99
197 HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, SOCIAL SECURITY FINANCING AMENDMENTS OF
1977, H. REP. No. 95-702, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 12 (1977) [hereinafter cited as WAYS &
MEANS COMMITTEE REPORT]. In 1982, the replacement rates are scheduled to be 25% for
the maximum earner, 44% for the average earner, and 57% for the minimum wage
earner. See 1979 ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 6, at 59.
198 WAYS & MEANS COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 197, at 57.
199 This decision was deliberate. "Indexing the worker's wages ... would virtually elimi-
nate the unintended and growing advantage that young disabled workers and their families
and the survivors of deceased [young] workers have over retired workers under the pres-
ent law." Id. at 25. See also SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 191, at 22. A
simple example illustrates this shift. Suppose a father and son worked on the same assem-
bly line, earning approximately the same wage. If both were killed in an auto accident, the
son's family would, under the old law, almost surely get higher benefits, even though the
father may have been covered by Social Security for 20 more years. Under the new rule,
however, in survivor and disability cases, past wages are updated through indexing. If both
father and son earned average annual wages throughout their careers, on their deaths they
both will have an average wage AIME and hence average PIA's. Thus, although the
father's family would not get more than his son's, it would not get less-assuming the same
19801
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2. Changes in the Children's Benefit Amount, the Family Maximum
and the Earned Income Test
Children's benefits continue to be based on the worker's ben-
efit amount. For children of retired workers, the rate has stayed
at 50%, and it now applies to children of the disabled. The 1960
Amendments, however, raised the benefits for surviving children
of deceased workers to 75% of the worker's PIA.200 In any indi-
vidual family, however, the benefits are still subject to the family
maximum, which has also been modified.
a. Missed Opportunities in Child Benefit Reforms. Congress, in
granting increased benefits to surviving children, did not consider
either putting the child's benefit formula on different terms or
distributing the new benefits differently. For example, rather than
increasing the benefits paid all children to 75% of the worker's
PIA, the new money might have created a substantial minimum
child's benefit.201  Congress could also have added a flat dollar
amount to the previous 50% rate. Both of these proposals would
have aided children of low wage-earners more than the plan Con-
gress adopted. Alternatively, the new money could have been
used to increase the family maximum, a move that would also
have focused aid on larger and probably needier families. Instead,
because the boost was tied to the worker's PIA, children in smaller
families whose fathers or mothers had earned the most received
the largest increase. This result hardly promotes the goal of social
adequacy.
b. Family Maxima Confusion. Although various amendments
since 1939 have increased the family maximum, these changes
have done little except keep the family maximum in line with the
ever-improving PIA formula. For example, the 1950 test elimi-
family composition. The other result is that, starting in 1979, beneficiaries tied to accounts
of younger workers-many of whom are children-get substantially less than they would
have received under the old law. The result of the old rule may have been intended. It is
at least arguable that the son, already making nearly his father's wage, could have looked
forward to even higher income had he lived. The higher benefits his dependents received
under the old rule were designed to compensate his family for that expectation. Congress
apparently found this argument unpersuasive. See WAYS & MEANS COMMIITTEE REPORT,
supra note 197, at 29.
200 Social Security Amendments of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-778, § 301, 74 Stat. 959
(amending 42 U.S.C. § 402 (1952)). As an intermediate step, Congress in 1950 provided a
single extra child's benefit amount of 25% of the worker's benefit amount, regardless of
the number of children in his family. See generally A. MUNNELL, supra note 6, at 176-77.
201 Congress has, however, indirectly increased the minimum dependent benefits by in-




nated the old 200% of PIA ceiling that affected lower earners
most, and established dollar ceilings.20 2 The 1958 changes made
the family maximum the lesser of $254 a month or 80% of AMW,
but not less than 150% of PIA (or PIA plus $20).203 Because
$254 was then double the maximum possible PIA, the result of
this complex formula was that the family maximum varied oddly
in relation to the worker's PIA. Depending on the amount of the
worker's average monthly wages, the maximum rose from 150%
of his PIA to over 200% of his PIA, and then fell back to 200%.
The 1977 Amendments preserved this pattern, setting the
family maximum at 150% of the first $230 of PIA, increasing it to
188% of PIA for PIAs up to $332 and then reducing it to 175%
of PIA for PIAs of $433 and more.20 4 Although this complex
formula appears somewhat illogical, it does insure that anyone
with an AIME of up to $300 will have a family maximum in ex-
cess of his AIME. This is an understandable reflection of the
needs of very low income families; it also indicates that Title I
benefits are no longer restricted to less than the worker's earn-
ings. However, there seems to be no particular rationale for pro-
viding an accelerated family maximum for workers with AIMEs
between $393 and $712-the range that generates PTAs of from
$230 to $332 a month.
The 1977 reformers apparently did not want to deal with the
issue. Instead, they kept in place the relationships that had al-
ready developed. 0 5 Assuming it is desirable to impose a family
maximum, simplicity alone would suggest a rule that adopted a
uniform proportion of the PIA. A 175% of PIA rule would prob-
ably cost no more than the current rule. 206 On the other hand, a
different arrangement could further favor low wage-earners with
more dependents. For example, a family maximum of 200% of
PIA for PIA amounts up to a given level and then phasing down
to 100% of PIA for amounts above that level would favor those
families most in need. Rather than liberalizing this amount, how-
202 See Soc. SEc. BULL., Oct. 1950, at 10.
203 See A. MUNNELL, supra note 6, at 172.
204 WAYS & MEANS COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 197, at 28. The bend points in the
family maximum formula are to be raised as the PIA bend points are changed over time.
205 Id. at 28.
206 In 1972, Professor Brown proposed that the family maximum be set at 200% of PIA,
suggesting then that this would not add greatly to the program's cost. J. BROWN, supra note
32, at 148. Other things being equal, under the current formula, unlike the 1939 formula,




ever, Congress in 1980 cut back on the family maximum in disa-
bility cases. The cutback will harm most larger families with rela-
tively low wage records.
2 0 7
c. Inattention in the Earnings Test Reform. Amendments since
1939 have increased the income a recipient can earn without re-
ducing or terminating his Title II benefits. In 1950, Congress
raised this amount to $50 per month from $14.99.208 Moreover,
starting in 1950, the earnings of a recipient over age seventy-five
had no effect on his benefits. In 1954, Congress amended this
provision to apply at age seventy-two. 20 9  By 1972 those under
age seventy-two could earn $175 per month without losing any
benefits, and those who earned more lost one dollar of benefits
for every two dollars earned.2 10  In short, the system effectively
imposed a 50% tax on earned income above a $2,100 annual
exemption. As with other provisions in the 1972 law, Congress
created an automatic upward adjustment in the exempt amount.
Recently, the concept of benefit reduction for earned income
has come under increasing attack. The most outspoken advocates
of change seek to make the scheme an old age plan, not simply a
retirement scheme. They argue that all elderly people-working
or not-should receive benefits at age sixty-five, because they
have duly contributed, and are old enough to receive benefits.2 1
In addition, representatives of the poor allege that the earnings
test forces some would-be retirees to continue working at a full-
time job because many workers' benefit levels provide inadequate
support and part-time work quickly eats up benefits, leaving the
worker impoverished. Moreover, they point out that easing the
retirement test will allow some recipients who now combine Social
Security and SSI to instead combine Social Security and work. Fi-
nally, critics charge that by making earnings the only form of in-
come that diminishes Title II benefits, the test unfairly discrimi-
nated against the working class. A poverty-diminishing reform
does not, however, require a complete end to the earnings test.
Rather, the earnings test could be phased in with higher PIA
levels, thus eliminating the test for those it burdens most.
2 12
In the face of these considerable pressures, Congress in 1977
207 Social Security Disability Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-265, § 101, 94 Stat.
441 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 403, 415, 423, 424a).
208 See A. MUNNELL, supra note 6, at 179.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 See 1979 ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 6, at 180-85.




increased the annual exemption from $3,000 to $4,000 starting in
1978, and, incrementally, to $6,000 in 1982.213 Moreover, it re-
duced the age after which all earnings are exempt from seventy-
two to seventy, effective in 1982.214
d. Dependents and the Earnings Test. Until 1977, Congress
made any change in the earnings test apply to all beneficiaries.
For example, in 1977 a child beneficiary, or one who received his
mother's benefits, could earn $250 a month without losing any
portion of his grant.215  The 1977 Amendments broke from this
pattern. The relaxation of the earnings test described above only
applies to persons age sixty-five and over. Younger beneficiaries,
and children and their younger mothers, for example, are left
with the old, lower rate.2 16 Political reality probably best explains
this disparity: the elderly, not widows and children, lobbied for
the change.
Some policies, however, justify the less favorable treatment of
mothers and children. Congress originally provided benefits for a
wife or widow with dependent children to allow her to stay home
and care for her family. Giving her benefits while she engages in
substantial employment would not further that goal, and would
create an unjustified distinction between her and a young, child-
less widow, who has always been ineligible for payments, on the
ground that she could and should work. On the other hand, if
Congress wished to encourage widows with children to work
rather than to rely entirely on benefits, but was not willing to take
all their benefits away, a reasonably liberal earnings test might
have been wiser. Thus, a middle ground between the 1939 $15
per month rule and the current rule for the elderly might have
been appropriate; hence, the current law may indeed be quite
fair.
On the other hand, some young mother recipients undoubt-
edly face the same problems as some of the elderly: their family's
benefits are so low that they must work to support their family.
Yet the strict earnings test may put them in a bind: for the chil-
dren's sake, they may feel they can only work part-time, yet they
213 Conference Agreement, supra note 177, at 2499-549.
214 Id.
215 See A. MUNNELL, supra note 6, at 179.
216 See Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, § 203, 91 Stat. 1527
(amending 42 U.S.C. § 402 (1976)). The Senate version would have applied the liberalized
test to all beneficiaries, but the House version, which was ultimately adopted, limited it to
those over age sixty-five. See WAYS & MEANS COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 197, at 14;




cannot afford to start losing their benefits if their incomes exceed
$250 per month. Thus, phasing in the earnings test at higher PIA
levels might be a sensible solution to the dilemmas of both these
mothers and the elderly."1 7 This does not, however, seem ur-
gent; $400 a month in earnings only reduced their benefits by
$75 a month in 1977.
Children who work full-time may be independent and not in
need of benefits. Here too, a very generous earnings test may
miss the point of the program. Allowing some part-time work by
child beneficiaries without benefit loss is probably desirable, and
policing any rule that forbade such work would be difficult to
enforce. The $250 monthly amount allowed in 1977 seems to ac-
commodate both of these considerations.
On balance, the failure to extend the liberalized earnings test
to those younger than age sixty-five does not seem particularly
unfair.2 18  Indeed, the most anomalous aspect of the earnings test
remains: although a widowed mother earning $25,000 a year will
lose her own benefits, her income does not at all affect the pay-
ments to her children. Congress could easily provide that once a
mother earns more than what the Bureau of Labor Statistics con-
siders necessary for a moderate standard of living, her children's
benefits will also cease. This would better implement Congress'
intent to provide benefits only to assure recipients an adequate
standard of living. Without such a rule, the different treatment of
these children and AFDC children who lose benefits when their
mothers work seems especially inequitable.
2 19
C. "Welfare" Changes
As Title II evolved, so did Title I. For example, starting in
1974, Title XVI's Supplementary Security Income plan (SSI) re-
placed the grant-in-aid OAA program of Title I. SSI now pro-
vides federally funded means-tested aid to elderly, disabled, and
blind poor people. Many SSI recipients also receive Social Security
and SSI serves to "top up" otherwise inadequate Title II ben-
efits.
220
217 See note 212 and accompanying text supra.
218 In 1979, the Council nonetheless recommended making the more generous retire-
ment test applicable to those under age sixty-five. See 1979 ADVISORY COUNCIL REPORT,
supra note 6, at 184.
2 9 AFDC reduces a family's benefits by $2 for every $3 earned after a monthly deduc-
tion of $30, plus certain work-related expenses. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7)-(8) (1976 & Supp.
III 1979).
220 A high proportion of SSI recipients also receive some OASDI benefits. Plainly, the
decision to create a national means-tested program for the elderly poor raises questions
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In contrast, the AFDC program has remained almost static.
The basic terms of Title IV have changed remarkably little since
1935. Congress has imposed new conditions on the states in re-
turn for continued federal aid, but the program remains a grant-
in-aid plan under which states are firmly in control of the amount
of benefits that claimants receive.
Despite Congressional inactivity in the area, after 1960 two
factors improved the AFDC program for poor children. First, the
number of AFDC claimants has increased dramatically.
Heightened awareness of eligibility, demographic changes, the
civil rights movement, urban riots and the war on poverty
contributed to the increase. A very high proportion of households
eligible for AFDC for any significant length of time receive ben-
efits.22i Second, the federal judiciary began to alter state AFDC
programs. Starting in 1968, the Supreme Court has used both the
constitution and Title IV to make AFDC available to many chil-
dren who were previously denied benefits.22 - The Court's deci-
sions may also have lent a new legitimacy to AFDC benefits and
recipients.223
Nevertheless, many policy analysts, welfare rights advocates,
and beneficiaries still disapprove of AFDC. Millions of children
continue to depend upon AFDC, whereas millions of others de-
pend instead on Social Security. It is time to consider eliminating
this disparate treatment by structuring a comprehensive benefit
program for children.
V
THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN'S
SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS
Concern for fairness-both among children within the
OASDI program and between those in and those outside the
program-must inform the future policies with respect to
OASDI. Structuring a .fair OASDI program turns largely on per-
sonal values.
about the continuing appropriateness of the "social adequacy" biases in Social Security ben-
efits for workers; but that is not our purpose here. See Martin, supra note 14, at 507-19.
2" See M. Bendick, Jr., Why Do Persons Eligible for Public Assistance Fail to Enroll?
(August 1979) (unpublished working paper no. 0819-02 of The Urban Institute).
222 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309
(1968).




Nonetheless, an analysis of issues of fairness is useful. First,
the manner in which a program actually functions may reveal an
inconsistency between the program's operation and the social val-
ues it is intended to promote. Second, examining arguments
about fairness may help both adversary groups and policy analysts
decide whether these issues ought to be given high priority. Fi-
nally, some of these issues do turn on facts rather than values and
are more vulnerable to logical criticism. Examination of various
policy options designed to eliminate OASDI's inequities puts the
issue of fairness into sharp focus.
A. Option I-Internal OASDI Reform
Suppose that (1) children's OASDI benefits were no longer
paid on a wage replacement basis; (2) the OASDI family
maximum were eliminated; and (3) the earnings test were to
apply differently to children's benefits. Children's benefits might
either be paid as a flat monthly sum per child; alternatively, they
might equal the difference between the family's other OASDI
benefits and a minimum family benefit level. Suppose that
monthly flat grants were $150 per child; or alternatively that the
family minimum for a widow with two children would equal $500
per month, for a disabled worker with a spouse and two children,
$600 per month, and so on. Under either scheme, the family
maximum would be repealed. Finally the earnings test would
change: sufficient earnings by either parent would reduce OASDI
child benefits on the same terms (one dollar lost for each two
dollars earned) that now govern OASDI generally.
1. OASDI Children Categorized
Of the five categories of OASDI child recipients, two-
children under 18 whose fathers (or in some cases mothers) are
either deceased or disabled-deserve special attention. At the end
of 1978, approximately two million children with deceased fathers
and 1.3 million children with disabled fathers received OASDI
funds. 22 4 A third and smaller group consists of children under
18 of retired OASDI beneficiaries -approximately 400,000 at the
end of 1979.225 Groups four and five include children over 18
with deceased, retired or disabled parents. These children qualify
for OASDI benefits either because they are in college and under




the disqualifying age, or are themselves disabled, thus qualifying
for benefits of their own. In March 1979, about 800,000 recip-
ients were in the former group, and approximately 400,000 in
the latter.2
26
2. Who Would be Affected by the Proposed Reform?
Assume that the aggregate amount of.OASDI children's ben-
efits is held constant. If so, then the "winners" and "losers" under
the proposed reform are easily identifiable. Higher benefits would
go to families with "breadwinners" who had earned relatively low
wages prior to death or disability. Higher benefits would also go
to relatively larger families- especially families with disabled
workers (that currently reach the family maximum more quickly,
because the disabled worker is an additional adult beneficiary).
Lower benefits would go to families whose former breadwinners
had earned relatively high wages prior to death or disability. Ben-
efits would also be reduced for OASDI families in which the
non-deceased or disabled .parent was working and earning sub-
stantial income.
This proposal would not significantly alter the number of
children in OASDI. Nor is it likely to change dramatically the size
of the AFDC program. Even though better basic OASDI benefits
would eliminate the need for some dual OASDI-AFDC families to
receive AFDC benefits, because this category is relatively small,
the impact of the proposal would not be great.2 27  A far more
important issue is whether an altered OASDI benefit structure
would mean that large numbers of OASDI families would have to
rely on AFDC as well. Historically, this may have been an impor-
tant reason for wage-related OASDI benefits. But this is currently
not a serious concern, because the proposed OASDI benefits will
surely exceed AFDC benefits in most states.228
226 Id.
227 In March 1977, for example, absent father cases alone accounted for 84.7% of the
AFDC load-a rise of over 7% since May, 1969. HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS,
REPORT ON THE SOCIAL WELFARE REFORM AMENDMENTS OF 1979, H.R. REP. No. 96-451,
96th Cong., Ist Sess. 94 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 HousE REPORT].
228 $500 a month for a widow with two children-the OASDI benefit level I have as-
sumed here-is well above the sum provided by AFDC to such households in most states.
In early 1980, for example, California paid a maximum of $410 per month to such family
benefit units. See Garda v. Woods, 103 Cal. App. 3d 702, 710 n.15, 163 Cal. Rptr. 272, 280
n.15 (Ct. App. 1980). If a widow with three children were to receive $600 from OASDI in
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3. The Case for Reform on Social Adequacy Grounds
The argument for this package of reforms -rests first on the
idea that individual equity does not demand wage-based children's
benefits; and second, that the goal of social adequacy would be
better served by the proposed scheme.
Initially, benefits for children were to be funded by reducing
benefits for single workers. This deviation from individual equity
was justified by concern for social adequacy. Over time, OASDI
funding arrangements and the benefit structure have evolved so
that current earners pay taxes that are almost immediately paid
out to current beneficiaries-a further support for the social
adequacy underpinnings for payments to dependent children.
229
Even if children's benefits are considered paid pursuant to a
uniform "insurance policy" obtained by all workers, no individual
equity argument supports adopting the current terms of that "pol-
icy." Instead, why are not workers with large families insured
against becoming disabled or dying on the same terms as those
with small ones? Why are not all workers insured so that their
disability or death yields their families a minimum income or a
fixed sum per child rather than a wage-related amount? On the
other hand, why should children receive any public "insurance"
when one parent dies or is disabled but the other is a substantial
wage-earner? Because individual payroll taxes cannot provide
contractual-based answers, other principles must govern. What are
the true implications of social adequacy as the governing princi-
ple? Under Option I, child benefits would be paid, to the extent
feasible, in accordance with real needs by providing families with
a decent income. The present OASDI system, however, fails to
guarantee adequate income to some qualifying families, while to
others it provides children's benefits even after a decent minimum
has been assured. It is this anomaly that Option I would alter-
without the need for additional funding.
230
addition to state payments, they would be slightly above the 1979 poverty level of $7,160
for a family of four. In 1979, except for Hawaii, no state's AFDC plan-even after adding
the value of food stamps received-paid more than poverty-level income to a family of
four. HoUsE REPORT, supra note 227, at 92.
229 See generally Ozawa, Individual Equity versus Social Adequacy in Federal Old-Age Insur-
ance, supra note 190, at 24.
230 The average monthly benefit paid to OASDI child beneficiaries in 1979 was about
$160. In July, 1979, OASDI benefits averaged $116 to 675,000 children of the retired,
$203 to 2,800,000 children of the deceased, and $93 to 1,500,000 children of the disabled.
Current Operating Statistics, Soc. SEC. BULL., Nov. 1979, at 42; Quarterly Statistics, Soc. SEC.
BULL., Sept. 1979, at 86 (numbers of recipients based on March 1979 figures). This is




Although both the uniform child benefit and the family
minimum approach (alternatively proposed by Option I) better
serve the goal of providing recipients with adequate income than
does the current wage-based approach, one might question
whether such a goal is the proper aim of Social Security. Might
social adequacy mean the maintenance of a family's past standard
of living? I think not. Distributive justice does not demand that
children be supported by society at a level commensurate with
their prior standard of living. Social adequacy is not served if
OASDI funds are used to maintain income differences that would
have continued had the breadwinners not died or become dis-
abled. That advantage is one that the child ought to obtain only
from his deceased or disabled parent's private insurance or sav-
ings.
Of course, a sharp drop in a child's standard of living would
add to the trauma caused by the death or disability of a parent.
But to respond to that concern with higher OASDI payments fails
to recognize the ongoing harm to a child whose family has always
been worse off; it implies the unacceptable view that the mainte-
nance of class status is justified because the poor have grown ac-
customed to their poverty.
The discussion has assumed that children are a separate
economic unit receiving their OASDI benefits in isolation. This
obviously is not the case. One or both of their parents will typi-
cally be receiving OASDI as well. This factor requires further at-
tention; indeed, the two main categories of child beneficiaries-
dependents of deceased wage-earners and dependents of disabled
wage-earners -should, for this purpose, be considered separately.
Minor surviving children typically qualify for benefits along
with their surviving parent (usually the mother), and that surviv-
ing parent qualifies solely because she has children in her care.
Under these circumstances I think Social Security still owes the
surviving family a decent income. The caretaker parent has no
In July 1979, the average OASDI payment to a disabled worker was $320.65; a dis-
abled worker's spouse received $95.77, and a child of a disabled worker $93.26. Current
Operating Statistics, Soc. SEC. BULL., Nov. 1979, at 42. Aggregating the total benefits for a
worker with a spouse and two children, the family would receive $602.94-slightly more
than the $600 monthly guarantee for such a family assumed at the beginning of this dis-
cussion. Of course, not all the sums could be used toward paying the family minimum.
Some high earners with no dependents would claim more than their average share. OASDI
disability benefits for workers becoming disabled in 1978 ranged from $122 to about $730
per month. SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, REPORT ON THE SOCIAL SECURITY AMENDMENTS OF
1979, S. REP. No. 96-408, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1979). The average family payment for
disabled workers with dependents in June 1979 was $639. Id.
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more of an OASDI claim to a wage-replacement benefit than does
a child. Neither individual equity nor social adequacy grounds
support such a result. Thus, a change in the formulation of the
child's benefit may well imply a change in the surviving parent's
benefit. This is more clearly the case if the child's benefit is cast as
a uniform amount. Otherwise, retaining the wage-related mother's
benefit would mean that OASDI would provide a higher standard
of living to some families who are not needy. On the other hand,
if the child's benefit is cast in a family minimum form, the formu-
lation of the mother's benefit may well be irrelevant since a larger
amount is offset by a smaller child's portion. Still, surviving wives
of the highest wage-earners might wind up under today's wage-
related formula with mother's benefits that by themselves exceed
the amount the family minimum would guarantee to a surviving
mother and child. To avoid that result, social adequacy for chil-
dren calls for a new mother's benefit as well. Indeed, there is no
real need for a separate mother's benefit at all; the family OASDI
benefit could instead be defined as a package, starting with
$350-$400 per month for a widowed mother and one child.
Children of disabled parents present a more difficult case be-
cause the breadwinner also receives benefits that concededly will
remain wage-related. What then should be the role of additional
OASDI benefits for children and the disabled person's spouse?
My view is that the concept of social adequacy should once more
justify providing a decent income. Thus, when the disabled
worker has children and a spouse, OASDI should supplement his
benefit to the extent necessary to assure the family a decent in-
come. In this setting, the family minimum formulation for child's
benefits is clearly preferable to the uniform amount per child
formulation alternatively proposed by Option I, since in some
cases the worker's benefit alone would equal or exceed the family
minimum.
After focusing on the family's income as the object of child
benefits for the two main categories of recipients, the need for a
changed earnings test, as proposed in Option I, becomes appar-
ent. If the caretaker parent earns a substantial income, the social
adequacy argument for paying additional benefits to both that
parent and the children is undercut because the family is no
longer needy. Hence, unlike the current practice, Option I would
require the caretaker's earnings to reduce the child's benefits as
well.
Similarly, the decent family income goal is served by remov-
ing the existing OASDI family maximum for both disabled work-
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ers and survivor families. It currently affects only children's ben-
efits, and thus stands in the way of assuring large families an
adequate income.
But is a decent family income to be the only goal of OASDI
children's benefits? Is social adequacy the only relevant principle?
4. Other Principles
Why do most think that families ought not find themselves
wealthier after the death or disability of a breadwinner? Disabled
workers, after all, may incur extra living costs (notwithstanding
some savings from work expenses). Similarly, single parent
families often incur special expenses and must go without substan-
tial non-cash benefits that a two parent family enjoys. In short, in
some ways a family's needs increase after the death or disability of
a breadwinner.
Nor do I think financial gain from the death or disability of
a breadwinner will create work disincentives. The narrowly-drawn
definition of disability, together with the required rehabilitation
programs and work-trial incentives contained in the Social Se-
curity Act, prevent relatively high benefits from significantly affect-
ing the behavior of disabled beneficiaries-notwithstanding some
economic theory to the contrary.2 3' OASDI benefits that are
higher than past family income might well influence whether the
surviving or nondisabled spouse works. But deterring this be-
havior is not a goal of the program; after all, the primary justifi-
cation for paying benefits to the caretaker parent is to enable the
parent to care for the child at home without working.
The sentiment against providing OASDI family benefits in
excess of the family's past income probably stems simply from a
sense that it is improper. For some, this may be simply a revulsion
over people profiting from the death or disability of a family
member. I do not share this feeling. A more satisfactory reason is
that the concept of work should be rewarded; that is, justice re-
quires that a family earn more if a member is working.
This too, is a controversial value. Some find it rather unfair
to suggest that A deserves more than B because A is working
when B is unable to work. As important as this debate is, it most
concerns the proportion of wages that are replaced by OASDI
when a worker is disabled or retires-a subject beyond the scope
of this Article. Still, given the wage replacement rates in OASDI
today, the issue does become relevant when children are involved.
21 See generally id. at 35-40.
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Notwithstanding the family maximum, some OASDI families,
especially those headed by disabled workers who were low-wage
earners, have been receiving more in benefits than the worker
ever earned in wages. 232 And my proposal in Option I to
guarantee a decent family minimum and eliminate the family
maximum could increase this number significantly.
If prior to death or disability, the worker made even less
than what OASDI would declare as a decent income for his fam-
ily, and if the family's previous income was not supplemented in
some other way, then we ought to be very concerned about their
well-being even before the breadwinner dies or becomes disabled.
Nonetheless, this creates a dilemma. If a worker is unable to earn
enough to support his family through full-time work, should not
government funds first assist him while he is employed? Alas, our
society may be unwilling to recognize the inability of the labor
market to provide decent incomes-a problem that might be
highlighted if OASDI payments to families often exceed the past
earnings of deceased or disabled workers.
In any event, my proposal would not be destroyed if OASDI
family benefits did not exceed the worker's past wage. A condition
could be attached that family benefits would be subject to a
maximum of the greater of 100% of the deceased or disabled
breadwinner's AIME or his full-time earnings from a minimum-
wage job. For example, a full time worker earning the minimum
wage (currently just above $3 per hour) should make somewhat
more than $6,000 per year, or $500 monthly. Thus, if this restric-
tion were in effect today, family benefits might be restricted,
where applicable, to the greater of the worker's AIME or $500. In
the spring of 1980, Congress responded to this concern in what I
consider a less desirable way by making the family maximum in
disability cases 85% of the worker's AIME.233
Option I reform might be questioned because of its potential
to stimulate large families. I find this quite unconvincing, for
families of both deceased and disabled workers. A more tenable
objection is that people should not have large families if they are
unable to provide adequately for them and that it is not right to
reward large families through the OASDI scheme. Again, this is a
232 In 1979-80, perhaps 6% of disabled workers receive individual OASDI benefits in
excess of their AIME. Id. at 37. Plainly more OASDIfamilies have gained financially from
the disability of a breadwinner.
233 Technically, the new limit is the lesser of (a) 85% of the worker's AIME (or 100% of
his PIA if larger) or (b) 150% of his PIA. Social Security Disability Amendments of 1980,




question of values; in my view it is not proper to penalize children
merely because they happen to have many siblings.
On the other hand, because economies of scale generally flow
from living in larger groups, I would expect that a reformed
OASDI child benefit scheme would contain some rough adjust-
ments designed to account for this. Hence, in the assured family
minimum version, while benefits would increase with family size,
there would be a decreasing incremental increase per child. Simi-
larly, the preliminary assumption in the alternative version, that
OASDI child benefits might equal $150 per month per child, is
too crude.
How is the scheme to account for cost of living variations
across the country? How can Congress set a uniform national fam-
ily minimum that will not be too low in some places and too high
in others? First, uniform family minimums are set for a variety of
purposes already-including the Bureau of Labor Statistics family
budgets, SSI, the level at which the earned income tax credit be-
gins to phase out, eligibility for federal Title XX social services,
and eligibility for free and reduced cost school lunches. Second,
while OASDI payments themselves vary across the country, aver-
age payment differences from state to state are less than many
may think. For example, in 1978 survivor children received ap-
proximately $190 per month in California, and $150 per month
in Mississippi.2 34 Of course, within each state and from family to
family there are substantial variations which, of course, Option I
intends to change.
A different reservation about using OASDI children's ben-
efits to assure a decent family income is that its emphasis on the
goal of social adequacy will make social security look too much
like welfare. But to whom and of what consequence? The ordi-
nary person, surely, has little idea that OASDI even serves a large
role in providing aid to children; most people, I believe, think
Social Security is a retirement scheme. Even experts often ignore
the children's benefit provisions of OASDI. Thus, Social Security's
popular image and political acceptability would be unaffected by
the adoption of Option I.
More important, therefore, is the political feasibility of Op-
tion I. The opinions of the chairmen of the Senate Finance and
House Ways and Means Committees, key presidential advisors,
policy people in the Social Security Administration, and spokes-
234 Quarterly Statistics, Soc. SEC. BuLL., Sept. 1979, at 90-91.
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people for important labor, business, and perhaps child welfare
and poverty groups are most likely to be crucial. Are there factors
that might make some of these important actors reluctant to sup-
port Option I?
Because social adequacy features of Social Security have tra-
ditionally been thought to come from the employer's share of the
payroll tax, employers' views may be considered particularly rel-
evant. Would not the self-interested view of employers be, "if you
must tax us, please let it be to benefit people who really need it?"
Yet this assumes the tradeoff is between helping the needy and
reducing taxes. The employers' response might be different if in-
stead they were told they would be taxed so much in any event.
Then employers might wish to favor employees with higher in-
comes for the same reason that many use private pension plans to
supplement the incomes of their higher earners. But it is, natur-
ally, more complicated than this. First, many private pension plans
today are "integrated" with social security so that adjustments in
OASDI might directly affect employers' obligations to pension
trusts. 23 5 And although the impact of Option I may be hard to
predict, uncertainty alone would militate against change. Second,
some employers-especially in certain unionized industries-
contribute to pension plans in a decidedly more egalitarian man-
ner by computing pension benefits solely on the employee's length
of service. 236 Perhaps this reflects a different view of how
OASDI child benefit funds should be allocated, or perhaps it
merely reflects union strength.
What, thefn, might unions and employees think about Option
I? This becomes more important in view of the common economic
assumption that the employer's share of the payroll tax really falls
on the employee.237 But it is difficult to say how workers per-
ceive their collective self-interest. In this "real world" look at the
program, one might ask how either current workers generally or
workers .with few or no dependents would want their taxes to
further social adequacy objectives. One piece of evidence that
favors the family minimum solution is that employees and their
representatives commonly obtain employer-paid medical insurance
plans that cover their families. On the other hand, when it comes
to income benefits in survivor and disability cases, even union-
235 See generally BANKERS TRUST COMPANY, 1975 STUDY OF CORPORATE PENSION PLANS
25-33 (1975).
236 Id.
237 See generally J. BRITTAIN, THE PAYROLL TAX FOR SOCIAL SECURITY 21-59 (1972).
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controlled private benefit plans probably do not reflect the prin-
ciples of Option I more than the current OASDI principles. A
focus on the practices of specific unions might, in any case, prove
misleading because some surely represent workers whose wages
are typically higher and more uniform than in other unions.
Moreover, while organized labor might count for more politically,
it hardly represents employees generally-especially low-earning
non-professional workers.
Child welfare advocates too often focus on the social service
needs of certain children rather than the cash needs of children
from low-income families. But if they did examine Option I, they
might fear that my criticisms of OASDI's current terms would not
lead to Option I, but rather to budget cutbacks. Their concern
would be that low-earner OASDI families and large OASDI
families would not attract the savings from cut-backs of higher
wage-earners and families with working caretaker spouses. Rather,
taxes would be cut.
Children's advocates may reason that although some children
are unfairly favored under the current program, an alternative
scenario in which no children are advantaged would be less desir-
able. More generally, perhaps the current terms reflect all the re-
distribution of income that Social Security can carry. This judg-
ment, along with a desire not to appear to be against children's
benefits, may also explain why both the Administration and the
Social Security Administration have avoided the child benefit is-
sue.
Nonetheless, if advocates in the poverty movement were to
support an OASDI reform of the sort here discussed, perhaps
some change could be achieved. Maybe a compromise could be
reached in which uniform rather than wage-related child benefits
are paid, and where the family maximum, although not abolished,
is made more progressive. It might, for example, start at 200% of
PIA and phase down to 100% of PIA as the worker's PIA in-
creases. However, Congress' 1980 modification of the family
maximum in disability cases is not too encouraging. 238
One explanation for this cutback is that low-earner OASDI
families have not been the focus of the anti-poverty movement,
which has aimed at families not served by OASDI. Thus, its goal
has been the reform of other programs-primarily AFDC. Let us
then leave Option I for now and consider other futures for
OASDI children's benefits that would also affect needy children
238 See UNEMPL. INS. REP. (CCH), May 1980, No. 979.
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not an OASDI. Social adequacy involves more than just OASDI
eligible children.
B. Programs for Non-OASDI Beneficiaries
1. Other Programs Aiding Minor Children
It is important to understand how other existing programs
respond to the actual or presumed needs of children in the first
three OASDI categories described above. Children with one de-
ceased or disabled parent can, in all states, qualify for AFDC-
provided the family is poor enough. Although most of these chil-
dren depend upon AFDC instead of OASDI, for others, AFDC
serves to supplement otherwise inadequate OASDI benefits. How-
ever, because most AFDC families are characterized by an absent,
rather than a deceased or disabled parent, they do not qualify for
OASDI. Moreover, unlike OASDI, under AFDC the single par-
ent's earnings reduce both the parent's benefit and the child's
benefit. On the other hand, like OASDI, some states impose a
family maximum on AFDC payments that reduces per capita
payments to larger families.239
Needy, or presumptively needy, children whose unemployed
breadwinner parent is able-bodied are in a different situation.
They must turn first to their state's unemployment compensation
program, which typically replaces 50% of the unemployed per-
son's wages up to the state average weekly wage.240 States typi-
cally pay unemployment compensation for only 6 to 9 months,
depending upon the unemployment rate. Most states pay no addi-
tional benefits if the wage earner has dependents, and in those
few that do the amounts are usually trivial.2 '" Reinforcing un-
employment compensation's individual wage-replacement fea-
tures, these programs ignore the earned income of other family
members, the family's wealth, and its unearned income. Thus,
apart from part-time earnings, which reduce the grant, un-
employment compensation programs do not contain an earnings
test similar to AFDC or OASDI. In sum, the presence of a child
in the home yields quite different social insurance consequences if
239 See generally Chief, Need Determination in AFDC Program, Soc. SEc. BULL., Sept. 1979,
at 19.
240 See generally NATIONAL COMMISSION ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION, FIRST IN-
TERIM REPORT 32, 44-46 (1978).
241 See HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMM., SUBCOMM. ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION,
94TH CONG., 1ST SEss., INFORMATION ON UNEMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSA-
TION PROGRAMS 46-50 (Comm. Print 1975).
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the breadwinner dies or becomes disabled on the one hand, or is
unemployed on the other.
A second program for unemployed breadwinners is available
in just over half the states. AFDC (here called AFDC-U) is also
available to the family whose former earner is unemployed but
whose unemployment compensation is either inadequate or no
longer available.2 42  As with AFDC generally, benefits are paid on
the basis of actual need, with additions for children (sometimes
subject to a family maximum). States without AFDC-U sometimes
provide, through residual general assistance programs, cash assis-
tance to families headed by able-bodied unemployed persons.
These programs vary considerably.
Finally, consider the situation of children of the working
poor. State and federal minimum wage'laws and legislation
facilitating collective bargaining have helped insure that the earn-
ings of full-time workers will be adequate to place their families
above the poverty level. This does not necessarily guarantee, how-
ever, that one full-time minimum wage job necessarily pays
"adequately" -especially for families with three or more children.
Thus, some families can fare worse on one minimum wage job
than on AFDC-U.243
It is noteworthy, then, that the federal government recently
has adopted two significant programs aimed primarily at the
working poor. The earned income tax credit ("EITC")244 is pay-
able to earners with families.2 45  A grant equal to 10% of earn-
ings is paid on annual income up to $5,000; benefits then phase
out as income increases. Although paid through the income tax
system, EITC is suitably described as a grant, because the credit is
"refundable"- payable in cash if the benefit exceeds taxes other-
wise due. At present, of course, even the maximum benefit is
modest. And although only available to families, no additional
credits are provided for children. But the scheme has great poten-
tial for growth.
242 See generally HOUSE REPORT, supra note 227, at 86-89, 118-21.
243 See, e.g., Macias v. Finch, 324 F. Supp. 1252, 1253 n.1 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd, 400 U.S. 913
(1970) (upholding validity of federal regulation defining those who work fewer than 30
hours weekly as "unemployed" and thus entitled to AFDC, and allowing inclusion of those
who work more than 30 but less than 35 hours weekly within definition).
244 I.R.C. § 43.
245 For a description of the EITC and proposed amendments, see HOUSE REPORT, supra
note 227, at 95, 145-48.
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The other significant plan is the food stamp program,"'
available to nearly all of the poor. Although AFDC recipients con-
stitute the bulk of the program's beneficiaries, intact working poor
families are eligible too-provided their income is low enough.
Like AFDC benefits, the food stamp benefit increases with family
size.
2. Other Programs Aiding Adult Child Beneficiaries
Other programs serve the "adult" categories of OASDI child
beneficiaries-college students and persons disabled at birth or in
childhood. College students have an elaborate system of federal
and state grants and loans available to help finance their
educations-whether or not they have a deceased, disabled, or
retired parent.247 Since 1974, cash support for adults who were
disabled while young has been available from the need-based Fed-
eral Supplemental Security Income program.248 This program is,
in effect, the AFDC counterpart for adult poor who are aged or
disabled. Many states supplement the basic federal amount.
This discussion of existing public income transfer programs
and their effect on different categories of children provides a
backdrop against which the next OASDI options can be consid-
ered.
C. Option H--Blanketing In
One way to achieve fairer treatment of children in and out of
OASDI might be called "blanketing in." This approach broadens
the risks covered by (and perhaps the persons covered by) the
OASDI program. New groups of presumptively needy children
would be added to the categories of children now eligible for de-
pendent's benefits, on the same terms as other eligible children.
These terms may be the existing terms or terms adopted pursuant
to Option I.
Among those that might be added to the current list are
children with an absent parent. Just as children with deceased and
disabled parents have been moved from AFDC to OASDI over
the years, most children on today's AFDC rolls-those with absent
fathers-would also be "elevated." Such a change might also be
246 7 U.S.C.A. §§'2011-27 (1980).
247 See generally Federal Aid to Postsecondary Students, 18 J. FAM. L. 147 (1979).




appropriate for other categories of beneficiaries such as children
of the unemployed and children of the working poor. Although
OASDI coverage for children with absent fathers has been pro-
posed from time to time,249 and providing OASDI for these other
classes of children has not, this is surely not determinative. What
are the justifications for broader coverage and how would inclu-
sion of these various groups promote those justifications?
The main advantages to beneficiaries derived from OASDI
coverage presumably are the potential for greater benefits and
reduced social stigma. On the surface, both seem to support
transfer from AFDC. Yet however stigmatizing in the past, AFDC
is probably considerably less so today. After all, because welfare is
seen more as a right, there is perhaps relatively little loss of self-
esteem in claiming welfare today. The availability of OASDI in-
stead of AFDC will probably not greatly increase self-esteem.
Stigma caused by demeaning AFDC administration also seems
minimal today, because most states have abandoned individualized
grants in favor of uniform awards based on simple demographic
characteristics, and have reduced the use of and intrusiveness of
welfare workers. Finally, as to the stigma arising from public
scorn of those who apply for welfare, it is likely that those who
denigrate single parents for their dependence on the state are
likely to continue to do so whether Congress "elevates" them to
OASDI or not. Indeed, recipients might be scorned even more
for receiving benefits from a program for which they have not
traditionally qualified.
Whether recipients' benefits improve depends, of course, on
the specific terms of OASDI. If Option I were enacted, OASDI
would certainly provide former AFDC families with a decent
minimum income. But because of the national variations in aid,
OASDI might not provide a financial gain to beneficiaries in all
states -including some with large AFDC populations. Thus, some
might fare worse if AFDC were abolished. On the other hand, if
AFDC were retained, for many the result would be dual-
entitlement, and virtually no change financially.
The situation of children of the unemployed and of the
working poor is vastly different. Although the programs geared to
help these families may be better regarded than AFDC, they do
not account for the presence of children in the family; both un-
249 See, e.g., U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON INZtOME MAINTENANCE PROGRAMS,




employment compensation programs and the minimum wage
largely ignore the existence of children. And although AFDC-U
and the earned income tax credit are family-sensitive, they are
very modest programs today. Hence, making these categories of
children eligible for OASDI promises to make many substantially
better off.
Moreover, in general terms, it is readily understandable how
OASDI family benefits might be determined for both unemployed
and working poor families. As for the former, following Option I,
OASDI benefits could supplement unemployment compensation
to the extent necessary to reach the OASDI family minimum.
Earnings, if any, of a spouse not receiving unemployment com-
pensation would affect benefits pursuant to the OASDI earnings
test-as in Option I. The same principles would apply if working
poor families were put on OASDI as well.
Is there a policy concern about the risks of unemployment,
low wages-indeed, even of having an absent breadwinner-that
renders these families inappropriate recipients of OASDI? These
risks are certainly as important to a family's financial security as
the risks of the death, disability or retirement of a breadwinner. It
must be understood, however, that to expand OASDI in this way
would make the program such a dominant component of our na-
tion's income protection mechanism that it would jeopardize all
other separate unemployment compensation and earned income
tax credit programs. In other words, if the program were to ex-
pand to this degree, payments to breadwinners as well as their de-
pendents would also seem sensibly integrated into OASDI.
The logic of broad "blanketing in" leads to OASDI insuring
individual wage-related income security and minimum family in-
come protection against all major risks, thus becoming a com-
prehensive system of social insurance. Put differently, benefits to
children soon become the tail that wags the dog. The expansion
of OASDI would dramatically restructure our public income
transfer schemes, with one result being that nearly all children
would be assured that their family has a decent income.
This restructuring, however, raises many hard questions.
How would unemployment insurance, with its tradition of weekly
compensation, mesh with OASDI's tradition of monthly or annual
accounting? What would happen to the merit rating tradition for
the financing of unemployment insurance? How would the com-
mitment to a family minimum in OASDI square with unemploy-
ment insurance's traditional willingness to disqualify entirely
claimants who voluntarily quit their jobs or refused suitable work?
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All of this suggests that if the needs of children of the un-
employed are a pressing concern and ought to be accorded the
same dignity as the needs of children of deceased or disabled par-
ents, then perhaps this problem should be remedied, not by merg-
ing unemployment insurance into OASDI, but by federal legisla-
tion reforming unemployment insurance itself.
Similar questions arise with respect to the EITC as well. The
income tax laws that govern dependents and the EITC's own
terms can be readily manipulated to give children of the working
poor financial security similar to that which OASDI would pro-
vide for its child beneficiaries. This retreat from OASDI as the
foundation for a comprehensive family financial support policy
brings us back to AFDC. Are its recipients specially appropriate
'for transfer to OASDI, or is it necessary only to reform AFDC?
Providing children with absent parent OASDI protection
creates some serious difficulties. In the existing categories, it is the
parent's absence from the work force that is the triggering event;
OASDI replaces income that he previously provided. But for
many AFDC families, the situation is different. On the one hand,
the absent parent may well be working, but providing inadequate
child support. On the other hand, in many cases neither the child
nor the mother had ever depended on the father. For example,
illegitimate children whose mothers never lived with their fathers
and children of non-working teenage fathers make up a signifi-
cant portion of the AFDC rolls. Of course, it matters little to the
child whether he is poor because a parent failed to provide life
insurance in the survivor cases, or child support here. Similarly,
from the child's view, the sufficiency of the absent parent's prior
or continuing earnings matters little. Still, to provide OASDI pro-
tection in all absent father cases would require a recharacteriza-
tion of the OASDI concept. For example, the elimination of the
prior labor force attachment requirement would, of course, affect
retired, disabled and survivor cases as well.
Apart from general prbblems of implementation, a child's
need created by inadequate child support deserves special consid-
eration. First, expanding OASDI might encourage non-payment
of child support. That is, because the absent parent is alive and
able-bodied, the availability of OASDI may give the absent parent
an excuse to abandon support or desert his child. But a preoccu-
pation with the "moral hazard" element would undercut AFDC as
well, unless the point is that through AFDC society deliberately
stigmatizes the child to encourage the absent parent to pay. A
genuine and related problem, however, is the impact of child
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support payments if children of absent parents received OASDI.
The existing OASDI terms would ignore this unearned income-
just as they ignore life insurance and savings in survivor cases and
disability income payments in disabled parent cases. AFDC, of
course, takes the opposite approach, paying benefits only to the
extent that child support is insufficient. Although many absent
fathers default on child support payments, a great many do not.
In short, in many cases the child is not needy; moving absent
father cases to OASDI will mean moving over far more than
AFDC families.
The sec6nd and more general objection to moving absent
parent cases to OASDI is that too much money would go to those
who have no social adequacy claim to it. Such children include not
only those who receive adequate support from an absent parent
but also children whose custodial parent remarries and are well
provided for by the step-parent. That this anomaly exists in the
current OASDI program suggests, of course, that equal treatment
of needy children will not be served by moving any more children
on to OASDI, but can be achieved by terminating OASDI chil-
dren's benefits and replacing them with a program better tailored
for the job. 25 0 This brings us to Options III and IV.
D. Option III-A Special Child's Benefit
One solution to the twin concerns so far addressed-
OASDI's favored treatment of children of higher earners and the
unfair exclusion of other children from OASDI-is the creation
of a new single benefit that would serve the needs of all children.
Under such a plan, all children would be entitled to a grant based
on age alone, regardless of whether they had a parent who was
deceased, disabled, absent, unemployed, or merely a low-wage
earner. A version of such a scheme, typically termed the chil-
dren's allowance or child benefit,251 exists in many countries and
enjoyed some popularity as a serious reform proposal in this
country during the 1960s. But it made little headway with Con-
gress, for good reasons.
If the child benefit alone is to adequately assure each child a
decent minimum income, its benefits must be far larger than in
countries that have adopted the program. Such a well-funded
215 See Ozawa, Income Redistribution and Social Security, supra note 190, at 220.
251 See generally BACKGROUND PAPERS, supra note 249, at 412-17.
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program would be very expensive. Because an adequate income
for the child requires an adequate income for his parent as well,
this becomes, in effect, a family allowance for all American
families. To be sure, higher taxes might be imposed to finance
this program (including the taxation of the family allowance it-
self); but unless the tax reduces the benefit to a mirage, such a
plan will necessarily transfer funds to families with children from
those without-whether or not the recipient family is needy. As a
result, the family allowance will not answer the criticism that
OASDI helps those who are not needy and that making an absent
parent an OASDI-covered risk would do the same. Indeed, the
family allowance would exacerbate the problem by extending the
overpayment to families with decent earned incomes.
Not only is this plan conceptually flawed, but its costs will
probably lead to the enactment of an inadequate partial child ben-
efit. Of course, combined with other income, even a modest
child benefit can help many children escape poverty. In this re-
spect, a modest child benefit can be particularly effective for chil-
dren of the working poor and the unemployed. But this scaled-
down child benefit alone will not suffice to meet the income needs
of the survivor, disabled parent and absent parent families. Their
needs would require either a new OASDI dependent family ben-
efit program and the continuation of AFDC benefits, or the cre-
ation of some new form of aid. Although the family allowance
itself could be awarded in different amounts depending upon the
family's financial situation, this individualized scheme would de-
stroy the central notion underlying the proposal-a uniform
award to all children. Differentiation (except on the basis of the
number of children in the family) transforms the proposal into a
different program.
E. Option IV-A National Guaranteed Annual Income
Suppose broad family adequacy objectives were pursued
neither through an expanded and reformed OASDI, as suggested
by the combination of Options I and II, nor through the universal
family allowance techniques of Option III, but instead by adopt-
ing a generous and non-stigmatizing national guaranteed annual
income scheme. This has been the main focus of the anti-poverty
movement.
The innumerable variations of such proposals tend to
obscure their substantial similarities. Each would establish a cer-
tain income to be provided to a family, individual or household.
Each plan then would reduce benefits as the family increases its
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income (typically this "tax" on benefits is greater on unearned in-
come than on earned income). Finally, each plan has a "break-
even" point at which a family's income is sufficient to cause ter-
mination of benefits. Plainly both the zero income benefit (the
"base") and the implicit tax on benefits affect the break-even
point. To control program costs,'a choice must be made between
(a) a higher base, a higher tax rate and a lower break-even point;
and (b) a lower base, a lower tax rate and a higher break-even
point.
Variations of this plan provide different answers to a number
of questions, including what the claiming units are, what counts as
income, the accounting period over which the claimant's need is
to be assessed, how to account for assets, how individualized need
is to be determined, and so on. Clearly, OASDI has answers to all
of these issues as well.
Some plans are designed to incrementally broaden and
nationalize the existing AFDC (and sometimes SSI) plan, 252 some
are structured as tax credits (often called the negative income
tax) 253 and some create a new guaranteed annual income pro-
gram within the SSA.254 Despite these differences, which are by
no means unimportant, all the proposals share the features de-
scribed above. Moreover, most of these proposals include some
provisions regarding work-requiring the able-bodied to look for
work, mandatory work training, or the actual promise of a suita-
ble job (with financial penalties for the failure to accept). What
are the implications of such a scheme for OASDI children's ben-
efits?
If OASDI remains the same, except that Social Security chil-
dren's benefits reduce a recipient's national income maintenance
payment dollar for dollar (as with AFDC today), the financial re-
sult would be that the only people to whom OASDI children's
benefits will matter are those who are not considered needy by
the national income maintenance program. And if that new pro-
gram turns out to be non-stigmatizing, there would surely be
some pressure to end the payment of OASDI to children whose
income needs were already being met. In short, OASDI children's
benefits might simply be phased out, leaving the new plan to ful-
fill all families' needs for a decent income-not just those with
deceased, retired and disabled parents. In this way, the concerns
252 See House REPORT, supra note 227, at 14-21.
253 Milton Friedman popularized this label in CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962).
254 President Carter's Better Jobs and Income plan advocated this approach. See H.R.
9030, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
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about favoring some OASDI children and excluding others from
OASDI altogether would be simultaneously addressed. At least
the needs of all minor children could be readily handled through
the new program.
Adult recipients of OASDI child benefits could be served in
other ways. College student beneficiaries could be helped through
existing college aid programs or new, expanded programs. Adults
disabled since childhood could be treated the same as other dis-
abled persons with inadequate OASDI benefits of their own,
through SSI or the new national income maintenance scheme. In
sum, if our nation could enact a satisfactory needs-tested pro-
gram, perhaps it could better achieve the social adequacy goals
now served by OASDI.
Some critics contend that any needs-tested program is unde-
sirable because it tends to create divisiveness and stigmatizes recip-
ients. z55 They would prefer a system of universal grants such as
the "social dividend" or the "demogrant." Indeed, the family
allowance described in Option III is a demogrant restricted to
families. I have already expressed my doubts about that pro-
posal.2 58  But there may be a better solution that would incorpo-
rate the social dividend concept into OASDI itself. Suppose all
Americans received a minimum Social Security payment, with
family payments adjusted to assure a family minimum. Under the
OASDI earnings test, earnings would cause a reduction in ben-
efits. Although the consequences for most children would be
similar in fact to those of Option II, this approach to Option IV
starts with quite a different assumption. Children and their
families would not be put onto OASDI because of certain trigger-
ing events that signify need. Rather, everyone would be on
OASDI. This plan would, of course, have to be integrated with
unemployment compensation and other schemes, and the treat-
ment of certain items of unearned income received by OASDI
recipients Would have to be resolved. The final result could be
that America would replace its current bewildering array of public
income transfer programs with one comprehensive scheme-
Social Security. In short, one central program would simultane-
ously serve both the social adequacy and wage-replacement objec-
tives for all classes of persons. It is vision that some would like to
pursue over the long run by organizing income maintenance re-
form not around a new welfare scheme or a special family allow-
255 See, e.g., Schorr, Welfare Reform and Social Insurance, CHALLENGE, Nov. 1977, at 14.
256 See text accompanying note 251 supra.
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ance, but rather around a comprehenive Social Security pro-
gram. The possibility of such a gradual reshaping of our total ben-
efit structure has special implications for short run OASDI child
benefit reform. Is Social Security still to serve a social adequacy
function or not?
In sum, even if one has a clear idea of the meaning of social
adequacy, without a consensus about the long run roles of today's
various federal benefit programs, it is difficult to determine what
OASDI child benefit reform measures should be pursued now.
Should the reforms suggested in Option I be adopted, with the
idea that OASDI will ultimately be our comprehensive national
income scheme? Or should OASDI children's benefits be phased
out in favor of some sort of new national income maintenance
scheme described by Option IV? This depends on what consensus
develops. For now, Social Security child benefit reformers are left
with a difficult choice, and, as I have emphasized, one that is
largely a matter of personal values.
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